Cabo Ligado Weekly: 6-12 September

September 14, 2021 Cabo Ligado

Total number of organized political violence events: 989
Total number of reported fatalities from organized political violence: 3,306
Total number of reported fatalities from civilian targeting: 1,492

All ACLED data are available for download via the data export tool and curated data files.

Situation Summary

Most combat in Cabo Delgado continues to take place outside the reach of media coverage. Last week brought vague reports of ongoing fighting in southern Mocimboa da Praia and northern Macomia districts, with one article suggesting that Mozambican troops and foreign allies were on the doorstep of a major insurgent base in the area, designated Siri 1, as early as 8 September. No specifics or casualty estimates from the fighting are available.

Some more specific incident reports, however, have illuminated the situation in Cabo Delgado last week. On 10 September, six civilians entered Nanjaba, a village about 16 kilometers northeast of Macomia town. The group, made up of women and children, reported that they had been held in insurgent custody for many months and had recently fled. Their escape is likely the result of insurgents leaving settled base areas in southern Mocimboa da Praia district in the face of advancing pro-government forces. It does, however, raise questions about the location of the dozens if not hundreds of civilians estimated to have been in insurgent custody in the area. Relatively few have been reported recovered since the government’s offensive into southern Mocimboa da Praia began.

According to multiple reports, troops from Mozambique, Rwanda, and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) were deployed in Niassa province as of 11 September. Rwandan and SAMIM troops were seen in the provincial capital of Lichinga. The soldiers are expected to pursue suspected insurgents in the province, including some who may be retreating there following insurgent territorial losses in Cabo Delgado. No reports of actual combat in Niassa have been confirmed at this point. In a recent press conference, Rwandan president Paul Kagame reported that his forces had obtained intelligence to the effect that insurgents were planning an expansion into Niassa.

On or around 12 September, insurgents ambushed a Rwandan armored column on a road between Mbau and Indegue, in southern Mocimboa da Praia district. Details on the attack are still unclear -- no damage estimates or casualty reports are yet available. What does seem clear is that the lead vehicle in the column, a South African-made Ratel infantry fighting vehicle, was disabled by a ground-based explosive. Reports differ as to the nature of the explosive -- some say that it was a landmine, others that it was an improvised explosive device (IED), and still others that it was an IED made from at least one landmine. Cabo Ligado can confirm that a later investigation of the blast site did indicate that there were at least landmine elements involved in the explosive. Another vehicle in the column was hit with a rocket propelled grenade at such close range that the grenade did not explode.

The report is concerning, both because it indicates the return of landmine use in Mozambique and because it suggests a new insurgent tactic. A recent report that Mozambican forces were using anti-vehicle landmines in Muidumbe district was sharply denied by Mozambican officials, who reiterated the country’s opposition to a weapon that has caused massive death and destruction among civilians over the course of Mozambican history. Yet, if anti-vehicle mines (which are not covered under the ban on anti-personnel mines laid out in the Ottawa Treaty, to which Mozambique is a party) are showing up in insurgent arsenals, this strongly suggests they are available to be stolen from Mozambican government forces.

The use of landmines and/or IEDs is a new innovation for the Cabo Delgado insurgency. If the group has the supplies and expertise necessary to launch similar ambushes, such attacks could be a major threat to both Mozambican troops and foreign intervenors. Rwandan and (to this point) SAMIM forces have largely embraced the Mozambican operational concept of remaining on roads, traveling largely in armored vehicles. That leaves nearly all the pro-government forces vulnerable to roadside explosions, particularly given how few major roads there are in the province that can support heavy armored vehicles.

Incident Focus: Food Distribution

The last edition of the Cabo Ligado Weekly noted that, due to budgetary constraints, the World Food Programme had made just one food aid disbursement to displaced civilians in July to cover July and August and would make a single disbursement in September to cover September and October. That distribution took place last week, and the results highlight some of the challenges and successes the international community has had in attempting to serve displaced Cabo Delgado residents.

In Montepuez district, the disbursement came in the form of vouchers, entitling recipients to purchase 3,600 meticais ($56.43) worth of food at retailers that accept the vouchers. At least one displaced persons resettlement center in the district received vouchers for double that amount, as they had been left out of the July disbursement. The vouchers are welcome, especially among displaced populations that have lacked support, but they are also driving price inflation, limiting displaced people’s buying power. In Montepuez and Balama districts, sugar prices have increased 20% and fish prices have jumped 75% in anticipation of the voucher disbursements. In the same shops, a 25 kilogram bag of rice now costs over half the total value of the voucher.

In Sunate, a village in Ancuabe district, the aid came in the form of food. People on the distribution list in Ancuabe received 50 kilograms of rice, four liters of cooking oil, and 10 kilograms of beans -- far more than what can be purchased with vouchers in Montepuez at inflated prices. Reports from the ground in Sunate indicate that the disbursement of food was well organized and that people were broadly satisfied that it was fair.

As of 9 September, no food aid distribution had yet reached Nachitenje, in Mueda district. Displaced people there reported that they had already consumed all the aid distributed in July and were in dire need of resupply and a nearby source of drinking water. Locals expected a shipment of food to arrive in the coming days.

In Chiure district, 300 displaced people living at the Katapua relocation site reported being passed over for food aid distribution, as a result of being left off the site’s distribution list. In the week since the initial distribution, no progress was made in getting the 300 into the system to receive aid. Food aid delivery has long been a challenge at Katapua. An assessment done in January 2021 found that displaced people were not able to access sufficient food there and that food aid deliveries to the area were experiencing two month delays.

Further south, in Nampula province, displaced people living in the provincial capital received direct food aid in the form of rice, cooking oil, beans, and other goods. The disbursement was welcome, but many complained about corruption in the distribution process. Local leaders reportedly included members of their patrimonial networks on the distribution lists, diverting some aid away from displaced people. This phenomenon has been reported frequently in Cabo Delgado.

Finally, there is significant confusion about the status of food aid in Macomia district. Aid disbursements had not been made in Macomia town as of 12 September. Some in the area believe that Macomia is being purposefully excluded from distribution due to a confrontation local civilians had with Mozambican President Filipe Nyusi during a presidential visit to the town, in which locals said that they would rather the president focus on ending the conflict than distributing aid. A lack of food in the district is driving fishermen to return to the Macomia coast to fish, a journey that has led to negative interactions with insurgents in the area.

Government Response

Besides the food distribution, there were other steps forward last week in improving quality of life for Cabo Delgado civilians. Electrical service has expanded in the north of the province, with Nangade district back online for the first time since insurgents destroyed the electrical substation at Awasse. The return of electricity has also led to the return of banking services to Mueda, where Banco Comercial e de Investimentos and Millennium Bim branches are back in business. Energy Minister Max Tonela announced last week that funding for electrical grid repairs in Cabo Delgado -- some $21 million overall -- comes from money that had been earmarked for grid expansion projects in other parts of Mozambique. The shift reflects the high priority Tonela’s ministry places on improving conditions in Cabo Delgado, but it also shows how unprepared the Northern Integrated Development Agency (ADIN) is to play a major role in reconstruction in the province. $21 million is a tiny portion of ADIN’s budget, and, had the agency been ready to spend the money, could presumably have been shifted to cover the energy ministry’s costs rather than forcing it to delay important work further south.

Despite these improvements, displaced people are still receiving mixed signals about their futures. Authorities last week warned locals around Miteda, Muidumbe district -- and, by extension, any displaced people looking to return to the area -- to vacate the area indefinitely. Mozambican and Rwandan troops are reportedly patrolling the area and believe that there are insurgent outposts they have not yet discovered.

Conversely, displaced people receiving their food aid vouchers in Pemba were told that this might be their final aid disbursement and urged to prepare to return to their home communities. Given the limited time available to start agricultural production before the rainy season comes, a decision about whether and when to send people back to their homes will have to be taken soon. Otherwise, authorities risk separating people from food aid during the lean season when they have no crops to harvest come autumn.

Rather than grapple with these difficult decisions publicly, however, the Mozambican government has chosen to focus on the positives in recent days. In a speech on 7 September, President Nyusi proclaimed that all towns and villages in Cabo Delgado are back in government hands. Nyusi used the speech to return to his oft-repeated theme that Mozambicans involved in the insurgency joined based only on monetary incentives and that foreign political interests drive the group. His comments came after Foreign Minister Veronica Macamo trumpeted the early successes of the Rwandan intervention in Cabo Delgado, perhaps underlining to skeptical elements within Frelimo the benefits of Nyusi’s international cooperation strategy.

Next on the government’s agenda appears to be an effort to get TotalEnergies back to work on the company’s liquified natural gas project in Palma district. Tonela told reporters last week that a “new schedule” for the project would be drawn up once the security situation improved enough to warrant it. There have been suggestions in the media -- perhaps planted by Mozambican government sources -- that TotalEnergies is eager to restart work as soon as possible, but there are no indications from the company itself that that is the case. Instead, the company’s country manager in Mozambique remains focused on cutting costs during the work shutdown.

On the international front, Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni extended his war of words with his Rwandan counterpart to include the Rwandan deployment to Cabo Delgado. In an interview, Museveni said that it was foolish to intervene in Cabo Delgado without addressing the Islamic State-associated Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) group in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), as the ADF, he claimed, is providing material support to the Mozambican insurgents. Though both groups fall under the umbrella of the Islamic State’s Central Africa Province, there is no hard public evidence that the ADF has provided significant external support to the Cabo Delgado insurgency. Museveni declared that he is prepared to send Ugandan troops to DRC to confront the ADF, but is waiting on an invitation from the Congolese government to do so.