Cabo Ligado Weekly: 3-9 July 2023

By the Numbers: Cabo Delgado, October 2017-July 2023 ¹

Figures updated as of 7 July 2023. Political violence includes Battles, Explosions/Remote violence, and Violence against civilians event types. Violence targeting civilians includes Explosions/Remote violence and Violence against civilians event types where civilians are targeted. Fatalities for the two categories thus overlap for certain events. ACLED is a living dataset and figures are subject to change as new information becomes available.

Total number of political violence events: 1,659
Total number of reported fatalities from political violence: 4,713
Total number of reported fatalities from political violence targeting civilians: 2,018

All ACLED data are available for download via the data export tool and curated data files.

Situation Summary

Following last week’s outbreak of violence, insurgent activity has intensified along the Messalo river in Mocímboa da Praia district, particularly around the village of Limala, but unclear and conflicting reports have made it challenging to confirm details. Most notably, local sources disagreed on the nature of a clash at Limala on 6 July. One claimed that insurgents assaulted and killed several members of the police Rapid Intervention Unit, prompting a counter-attack from the Rwanda Defence Force, while another told Cabo Ligado there was no attack at all, and insurgents just looted the village.

In any case, there are significant insurgent movements around Limala. Groups of fighters appear to be migrating from Macomia and Muidumbe districts toward Mocímboa da Praia, taking advantage of the shallow Messalo river, which is now easily fordable, according to a local source. It is possible insurgents are aiming to take control of an old coastal road, known locally as the Estrada Velha, or ‘Antigua,’ which connects Quiterajo in Macomia district to Mocímboa da Praia town, and which would give them freedom of movement along the coastal strip.

Insurgents also still have some presence further south in Macomia, as fighters entered Pangane on 3 July to buy goods.

Meanwhile, in Muidumbe district, insurgents have been spotted around the villages of Mandava and Mandela since 30 June, but they reportedly insist they mean no harm to the local population, a local source said. This would suggest insurgents are expanding their campaign to win favor with local communities to Muidumbe district, while they had previously focused this strategy on the coast of Macomia and Mocímboa da Praia.

Weekly Focus: SAMIM Mandate Renewal

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) Mission in Mozambique’s (SAMIM) mandate was renewed on 11 July. It had been set to expire on 15 July. Not yet officially announced through SADC channels, the announcement was made by Namibian President Hage Geingob at the SADC Organ Troika meeting’s conclusion. A document prepared for the meeting that is in circulation online indicates that the meeting was set to propose a 12-month extension, with a view to beginning a drawdown of troops in December 2023, and full withdrawal by July 2024. Billed as the “Extra-Ordinary Meeting of the Ministerial Committee of the Organ Troika, Plus SADC Troika & Force Intervention Brigade Troop Contributing Countries, and SAMIM Personnel Contributing Countries, and the Republic of Mozambique,” its title reflects the complexity of the security challenges that SADC faces. As well as extending SAMIM’s mandate, the summit also set 30 September as the deadline for the deployment of a SADC Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, following a commitment to such an action in May.

SAMIM operations have had an impact in the province. The Botswana contingent based in Mueda and also covering Muidumbe district, has successfully restricted insurgents to the southern lowlands of Muidumbe district. In doing so, the Botswana Defence Force has been hit twice by IEDs, thought to have been laid to restrict access to a likely insurgents’ base in the district close to the Messalo river. Withdrawal would undermine the return of displaced populations to the north of the Muidumbe, and threaten Mueda district. In Nangade district, operations that started in September 2022, have for the most part cleared the district of insurgents on offensive operations.

SAMIM’s other area of responsibility is Macomia, where the South African contingent has responsibility. This is where the greatest security challenge lies, with insurgents having bases in Catupa forest and nearby Namurusssia, and concerns that the coastal strip of the district is becoming a significant logistics center for them.

In official communications, SADC has not successfully communicated SAMIM’s status. The renewal date of 15 July is deduced from the start of the mission in 2021. It has been renewed three times since, the most recent renewal being in August 2022. This is understood to have been for one year, but the renewal term was not mentioned in the communiqué of the summit of SADC heads of state and government held in August 2022.

The prospect of SAMIM troop numbers decreasing in December – and the decrease being flagged up so soon – would in the first instance provide a propaganda win for Islamic State media. More importantly, it would require a significant reconfiguration of the other forces in the province. These are the Rwanda Security Forces, the Tanzania People’s Defence Force, and Mozambique’s Defense and Security Forces (FDS). If the foreign forces do not expand their coverage, it is unlikely that FDS could adequately secure the rest of the province. With this in mind, the drawdown may be aspirational.

Lack of clarity over renewal and the processes around it has raised anxiety in communities. In May 2023, Nangade district community leaders explicitly raised their concerns about the mandate ending on 15 July with a visiting SAMIM commander. They urged SAMIM to remain in place until freedom of movement had been restored in the district.

The lack of public communication over mandate renewal reflects poor communication between the mission and its host government. The effect of this is seen at the field level, where poor coordination between host government forces and SAMIM is said to be a characteristic of the conflict. Until those relationships are fixed, communities like those in Nangade will remain in the dark about SAMIM’s future role.

Weekly Round-Up

Conflict in Cabo Delgado is diverting funds from other areas, Nyusi says

Mozambican President Filipe Nyusi has stated that the ongoing armed conflict in Cabo Delgado province is forcing the government to divert funds from other areas of public spending to address the challenges in the region. The fight against terrorism has required resources for providing food, water, uniforms, and ammunition to the military in Cabo Delgado, as well as supporting displaced people, he said. While the conflict has imposed a serious financial burden on the state, it may not be a coincidence that Nyusi made this statement as his government comes under increasing pressure from the International Monetary Fund to meet spending benchmarks agreed in May 2022.

Mozambique government to fund 500 youth businesses in Cabo Delgado

The government of Mozambique, with support from the World Bank, plans to finance 500 small youth businesses in Cabo Delgado to help counter extremist recruitment and tackle inequality. The selected individuals will receive training in business management and project development. They are part of a group of 3,500 young people from across the country who will benefit from funding under the government's "Agora Emprega" program. The initial stage of the program will provide up to 1.5 million meticais (US 23,476 dollars) in non-reimbursable funding for project development.