Cabo Ligado Weekly: 28 November-4 December 2022

By the Numbers: Cabo Delgado, October 2017-December 2022

Figures updated as of 2 December 2022. Organized political violence includes Battles, Explosions/Remote violence, and Violence against civilians event types. Organized violence targeting civilians includes Explosions/Remote violence and Violence against civilians event types where civilians are targeted. Fatalities for the two categories thus overlap for certain events.

  • Total number of organized political violence events: 1,533

  • Total number of reported fatalities from organized political violence: 4,497

  • Total number of reported fatalities from organized violence targeting civilians: 1,978

All ACLED data are available for download via the data export tool and curated data files.

Situation Summary

Security forces from Mozambique and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) sustained heavy losses last week. On 28 November, five soldiers in the Mozambican Defense Armed Forces (FADM) were killed in an ambush near Miangalewa, on the Muidumbe-Macomia district border. A police commandant and his family were ambushed and killed near the same location on 20 November, possibly by the same group of insurgents. On 4 December, Islamic State (IS) affiliated news service Amaq published a video featuring a display of weapons and ammunition allegedly captured in a recent attack in Muidumbe, possibly referring to Miangalewa. The display includes large quantities of assault rifles, light machine guns, and rocket-propelled grenades. IS itself issued a claim the same day for the 20 November attack. 

On 30 November, SAMIM acknowledged in a statement that it had lost two soldiers – one from Tanzania and one from Botswana – in a clash with insurgents near Nkonga in Nangade district on 29 November (see Weekly Focus below). Another Tanzanian soldier was injured and taken to the SAMIM hospital in Pemba. At the end of the statement, SAMIM also said that it had killed 30 insurgents in return and seized “a sizable number of weapons, ammunition and equipment.” If accurate, this would be one of the largest numbers of insurgents killed in a single engagement since the start of the conflict, and would be a major blow to their operational capacity in that area. No independent source has been able to verify this claim so far.

Then, on 2 December, SAMIM and the Botswana Defence Force (BDF) issued statements admitting that a major in the BDF shot and killed a female private, and injured one other, in an incident in Pemba, where they are stationed. Botswana media later reported that the woman who was killed was the officer’s girlfriend; and that the officer was married to another officer in the BDF, who was not stationed in Mozambique.

Sources suggest insurgents have returned to Namuno district as a man was reportedly captured on his motorbike near Maravi village, approximately 50 km south of Namuno town, on 30 November. His bike was set on fire and he was beaten but later released and told to tell the village the insurgents were coming for them – a strategy commonly used by the insurgents to spread fear and chaos. The Naparama militia was dispatched in pursuit of the group. 

The Naparama, who emerged in Namuno in early November, have become prominent actors in the conflict in recent weeks. An unconfirmed report from Mozambican state broadcaster TVM claimed that the Naparama recently killed 11 insurgents and injured six others in Balama district. TVM also reported that the first secretary of Frelimo in Cabo Delgado had met with representatives of the Naparama and called on them to work in partnership with government security forces, which may involve manning checkpoints, searching cars, and checking identification. 

This suggests that the Naparama are being co-opted to not only fight the insurgency but also to enforce justice with apparently little accountability. On 23 November, the Naparama captured a suspected insurgent and burned his body in front of a crowd in Mirate, Montepuez district. On 30 November, an unverified source reported that the Naparama killed three civilians somewhere in Montepuez after being denounced as murderers by a local woman. In Namuno district, people have complained to the authorities about mistreatment by Naparama at road checkpoints. Such incidents raise the specter of more vigilante-style violence, which is likely to further complicate efforts to establish effective security and policing in affected communities. The provincial commander of the police in Cabo Delgado, Vicente Chicote, also warned last week that Naparama groups could be vulnerable to infiltration by insurgents. 

In Chiure district, police authorities detained 28 young people on suspicion of trying to join the insurgency after they were caught crossing the Lúrio river from Nampula province into Cabo Delgado, according to Carta de Moçambique. The detainees, from Nacala and Memba districts, claimed they were going to Mocímboa da Praia to work as fishermen. Nampula province police spokesperson Zacarias Nacute said the youths would not face charges, and were to be returned to their families as they had been in “the recruitment process,” and not “in the line of fire.

And in Pemba, a group of young men were arrested last week after apparently setting up a Muslim religious school in a house in the town. Police were alerted by neighbors, and said the men were studying Quran when they raided the house. The 15 men, aged between 18-30, come from various places in Cabo Delgado and one from Nacala in Nampula province. One had recently returned to Pemba after having studied Quran in Sudan.

The owner of the house where the madrasa was operating has also been detained for not having informed the police about it. Beyond the suspects’ obvious adherence to Islam, the police say they found them in possession of some military clothing, as well as rucksacks which the police also claim are suspicious. The 15 deny any involvement in the insurgency, but the case is clearly indicative of the level of paranoia in Pemba, not only among the police but also local residents.

Weekly Focus: SAMIM Losses in Nangade

The remains of Sergeant Musa Mpondo and Lance Corporal Zikamee Kamai, the SAMIM troops killed at Nkonga, were returned to Tanzania and Botswana respectively on 1 December.  A ceremony for the repatriation of their remains at Pemba airport was attended by representatives of the SAMIM contributing countries and SAMIM leadership. Plain wooden caskets, marked by hand ‘Tanzania’ and ‘Botswana,’ were borne onto aircraft for their return to their families.

Sergeant Mpondo and Lance Corporal Kamai were killed in “a contact with Ahlu-Sunna Wa-Jamaah terrorists,” according to SAMIM. The killing of the two soldiers raises a number of questions about the situation in Nangade district. These relate in the first instance to the extent of the insurgents’ presence there, SAMIM and FADM operations in the district, and the possibility of Rwandan forces being operational in the district.

The “general area of Nkonga village” referred to in SAMIM’s announcement is understood to be the site of one, or a number, of insurgent encampments. Operations undertaken by SAMIM, as well as the insurgents, suggest these were established by fighters moving from Palma and Mocímboa da Praia districts last year in the face of Rwandan forces. Their continued presence in Nkonga risked attacks into both Palma and Mocímboa da Praia districts, as well as within Nangade. The main settlements in the area are Nkonga to the south, Namiune to the north, and Quinto Congresso lying in between. The land is heavily forested and hard to access for SAMIM infantry, who rely on road access and risk ambush by more mobile insurgents. A soldier from Lesotho had his life taken in such an ambush on 16 September. The convoy he was riding in was believed to be in support of SAMIM operations near Namiune that were taking place at the time. The attackers of a Tanzanian SAMIM convoy on 15 November in the north of the district similarly took advantage of the wooded terrain. Cabo Ligado understands they escaped from the clash on motorbikes that allowed them to pass quickly through dense woodland.

SAMIM has not given any further details of the 29 November “contact,” other than the claim that they killed 30 insurgents and seized a “sizable number of arms and equipment.” Beyond the nationality of the deceased, there is no detail on which countries’ troops were involved, or FADM’s involvement.

Besides SAMIM and FADM, there is the intriguing possibility of Rwanda becoming involved beyond its current areas of operation in Mocímboa da Praia and Palma districts. President Paul Kagame said on 30 November that “we have agreed with the Mozambican government to pursue the terrorists where they are now. That’s what we are going to do.” With troops stationed at Pundanhar in Palma district, just 37 km northwest of Nkonga, supporting SAMIM operations in Nangade would seem an obvious option.

Government Response

Support from the European Union (EU) for Rwanda’s troop deployment in Mozambique, which has been in the pipeline since late 2021, was confirmed last week, but not before Rwandan President Paul Kagame had a final opportunity to reiterate that Rwanda had thus far been financing its support for Mozambique all by itself.

The European Council approved the €20 million package which, according to a statement, “will enable the acquisition of collective and personal equipment, and cover costs related to the strategic airlift needed to sustain the Rwandan deployment in Cabo Delgado.”

Rwanda’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Vincent Biruta, said his country “greatly appreciates the support.” He stated that it would support Rwandan troops to “fight armed terrorists in Cabo Delgado, restore peace and security, [and] enable the safe return of displaced residents to their homes.”

Biruta reiterated Kagame’s comments a few days earlier, saying that Rwanda’s troop contribution is now up to 2,500, from an initial 1,000 in July 2021, and that the Rwanda Defence Force is willing to be deployed wherever it is needed to fight the insurgency. 

The equipment and logistics being financed by the EU will not include lethal weaponry, just as the EU does not finance lethal weapons for the Mozambican military either. The financial help for Rwanda comes alongside the ongoing assistance of €89 million for FADM in conjunction with the EU Training Mission in Mozambique (EUTM), and €15 million support for SAMIM.

On 29 November, a delegation of the EU’s Politico-Military Group (PMG) visited the EUTM operation in Katembe, next to the capital Maputo, where marines are trained by EU military trainers. The PMG carries out preparatory work in the field of the Common Security and Defence Policy for the Political and Security Committee, a statement from the EUTM explained; and is chaired by a representative of the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Josep Borrell, who visited Mozambique in September. The visit likely informed the EU-Mozambique Political Dialogue that began 5 December in Maputo. 

The Denis Hurley Peace Institute (DHPI), the peace entity of the Southern African Catholic Bishops’ Conference, believes it has found holes in UN data on displaced people in northern Mozambique – with the organization’s director accusing the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) and International Organization for Migration (IOM) of uncritically republishing data from the Mozambican government, designed to promote an image of returning normality in the area.

Johan Viljoen, the DHPI Director, said after a visit to Nampula from 15-24 November that “the situation on the ground flatly contradicts official statistics.” In a report cited by Catholic news agency ACI Africa, he said the numbers in Nampula province, in particular, are unreliable, and claimed that “the lives of the poor are being sacrificed for the sake of political and economic expediency.”

Certainly, some figures published by IOM are, by now, rather dated, the last baseline assessment having been carried out in June this year. But Viljoen is criticizing figures that date from February; and the IOM also publishes weekly updates, though those numbers are not necessarily reflected in the totals that it and other UN agencies publish in their periodic reports. In contact with Cabo Ligado on 6 December, Viljoen conceded he had been using February figures rather than the most recent ones, but pointed to the fact that official numbers of internally displaced people (IDPs) had gone down further between February and June, which “proves the point I am trying to make even more so – that the figures show a decline from February to June, whereas on the ground the number of IDPs in all these places has in fact been increasing.”

There are concrete accounts from the ground in DHPI’s report that should cause concern. According to the report, there are now more than 6,000 IDPs at a camp at Rapale, a district neighboring the city of Nampula. There are, DHPI says, no facilities except a recently-installed borehole; there is no school, and no regular distribution of food or humanitarian assistance, according to DHPI.

Moreover, people are being persuaded to return home when it is not yet safe to do so – a concern DHPI shares with the UNHCR, which reiterated in its most recent update “the importance of ensuring that returns are safe, voluntary, conducted with dignity, based on an informed decision, and that basic services are restored in areas of origin. Until these conditions are met, it will be premature to promote returns in Cabo Delgado.”

There are worrying signs that various authorities in Mozambique are taking advantage of the situation of ‘terrorism’ in the north of the country to behave with increasing impunity. At the start of November, three Christian missionaries were arrested at the airport in Inhambane, southern Mozambique, as they loaded a cargo of food and medical aid for an orphanage in Balama, Cabo Delgado. For reasons which remain unclear, they were later charged with terrorism offenses, including reportedly being accused of supporting the insurgency. One source told Cabo Ligado that the police in Inhambane turned to the terror charge when they realized they could not hold the men simply for lacking the proper import documentation for their goods. The three have now been transferred to the maximum security prison in Maputo, known as the BO, where they face at least four months in jail while prosecutors investigate the charges fully.

And in Tete province, environmental NGO Justica Ambiental (JA) says a community leader who attended a JA-organized workshop in Maputo was arrested when returning home to his village, which is in line for destruction to make way for a huge new hydropower project, called Mphanda Nkuwa. He was interrogated and accused of enlisting villagers for the insurgency in Cabo Delgado; but JA suspects his treatment is related instead to his potential opposition to the hydropower project going ahead.

Closer to the conflict zone, two boats were apprehended off the coast of Zambezia, whose occupants only spoke Swahili, according to police sources cited by Integrity Magazine. The police got involved after locals called them, having found the presence of the boats strange. There is no suggestion in Integrity’s report that the people have been accused of involvement with the insurgency; however, that is likely to be behind the locals’ and police’s reaction.

© 2022 Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED). All rights reserved.

Previous
Previous

Cabo Ligado Weekly: 5-11 December 2022

Next
Next

Cabo Ligado Weekly: 21-27 November 2022