Cabo Ligado Weekly: 10-16 January
By the Numbers: Cabo Delgado, October 2017-January 2022
Figures updated as of 14 January 2022. Organized political violence includes Battles, Explosions/Remote violence, and Violence against civilians event types. Organized violence targeting civilians includes Explosions/Remote violence and Violence against civilians event types where civilians are targeted. Fatalities for the two categories thus overlap for certain events.
Total number of organized political violence events: 1,122
Total number of reported fatalities from organized political violence: 3,640
Total number of reported fatalities from organized violence targeting civilians: 1,591
All ACLED data are available for download via the data export tool and curated data files.
Situation Summary
Insurgent violence continued last week in both the northern and southern reaches of the conflict zone. On 11 January, a group of four insurgents attacked fishermen on Ilha Quilhaule, a small island in Ibo district. The insurgents killed one of the fishermen and looted much of their catch.
The next day, insurgents were in action in Meluco district. Over the course of the afternoon of 12 January, they struck three villages – Pitolha, Citate, and 1 de Maio – in Meluco district, along the road between Muaguide and the district capital. The Islamic State (IS) claimed the first two attacks. In Pitolha, the group claimed insurgents burned down 20 homes. According to a separate claim, in Citate, they burned down roughly 60 homes. No details are available about the 1 de Maio attack.
Also on 12 January, a group of four insurgents traveling by motorcycle attacked Luneke, Nangade district around midday, killing three civilians. There is a report of insurgents killing two civilians in nearby Unidade, Nangade district at the same time the Luneke attack was taking place. It is unclear if the attacks were simultaneous or if the Unidade report is simply a misattribution of the Luneke attack.
On 15 January, insurgents returned once again to Nova Zambezia, Macomia district, this time ambushing farmers working in their fields and beheading three men. Insurgents have been in Nova Zambezia frequently in December and January. They were there most recently in a 3 January attack that resulted in five civilian fatalities and 11 burned homes.
Also on 15 January, insurgents struck Mitepo, Meluco district, bringing them yet closer to the district capital. No details of the attack are available.
The same day, insurgents launched an evening attack against the village of 3 de Fevereiro, in Nangade district. Insurgents killed five civilians and burned a number of homes before troops from the Southern African Development Community’s (SADC) Standby Force Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) arrived. After SAMIM troops entered the village, there was an extended gun battle between them and the insurgents, but no casualties were reported.
On the evening of 16 January, insurgents attacked Nkoe village, Macomia district, setting homes on fire. No casualties were reported.
New information about earlier incidents also came to light last week.
IS claimed a clash between insurgents and Mozambican security forces in Cogolo, eastern Macomia district on 21 December, but did not claim any casualties on either side. No independent source confirms the clash.
On 6 January, insurgents again attacked Mariria, in eastern Meluco district, killing three civilians before being driven out of town by responding Mozambican security forces. Insurgents had been in Mariria just two days earlier, looting the village and burning homes. IS later claimed the 4 January attack on Mariria.
IS also claimed that insurgents attacked Micomela, in northern Mueda district, on 7 January. According to the claim, the insurgents fought with local militia there, killing one. No independent source confirms the claim, although there was fighting nearby the next day.
Further, IS claimed the insurgency’s 22 December attack on Naulala, Mecula district, saying that insurgents killed six Mozambican soldiers and burned homes. Independent reports put the death toll of that attack at five, none of whom appear to have been soldiers.
IS also issued a belated claim of the 4 January insurgents attack on Nova Vida, Macomia district. According to the claim, insurgents clashed with Mozambican soldiers, injuring one. Independent accounts say they only burned homes and looted food.
New details also emerged about the 7 January attack on Lijungo, Nangade district, for which no details were available in the last Cabo Ligado Weekly Report. Insurgents kidnapped five men in that attack, before burning a number of homes. Lijungo residents retreated to Nangade town for safety.
IS issued a detailed claim of the 8 January insurgent attack on Alberto Chipande village in Mueda district, saying that insurgents killed two militia members in the village, burned down 30 homes, and destroyed four motorcycles. An independent report of the attack also listed two fatalities, but only one of them was a member of the local militia.
Mozambican security forces said last week that they have searched over 3,000 houses in Mocimboa da Praia to gather intelligence and secure insurgent supply stockpiles before allowing civilians to return to the town. Various small supply stockpiles have been found, but it is unclear whether the search process is the reason it has taken so long to allow residents to come back to their homes. The government regained control of Mocimboa da Praia in August, but only in recent weeks has there been any indication of an impending opening of the town. Muslim and Christian religious leaders left Pemba for Mocimboa da Praia last week, intending to hold a ceremony in the town to signal its reopening. Yet even after they began their journey, government officials said publicly that no date for reopening has been set.
Incident Focus: Meluco District
A series of insurgent attacks since the start of 2022 mark the first sustained insurgent action in Meluco district since the start of the conflict. The inland district, west of Quissanga, has seen violence before. There were a smattering of insurgent attacks there in 2021, including most recently an October incident in Nangololo in which two women were kidnapped. Before that, the district suffered at least 11 incidents of violence against civilians involving insurgents spread across the first half of 2020, when eastern Meluco presented targets of opportunity for insurgent fighters launching frequent raids in neighboring Macomia and Quissanga districts.
The 2022 attacks, however, appear more focused than previous efforts, with nine incidents recorded so far for the first half of January. The direction of the attacks – westward along a road that eventually leads to Montepuez – does not suggest an attempt to threaten the site of major government military power. Instead, the Meluco offensive appears to be an attempt to gather resources while further spreading pro-government forces. Beyond that, as noted in the previous Cabo Ligado Weekly Report, eastern Meluco includes the route between Macomia town and Pemba, which is an important strategic objective for the insurgency if it wants to reprise its 2020 occupation of Macomia town.
Whether or not the insurgency achieves that objective, it has unquestionably unsettled Meluco residents. United Nations International Organization for Migration (IOM) data since the start of 2022 show that 545 people have become displaced in Meluco district in that time. That is almost certainly an undercount, as on the ground sources report many people leaving their homes to hide out in the forest for safety, which would prevent them from being included in IOM numbers. On 15 January, according to a local source, the road between Meluco town and Montepuez was “full of people” fleeing Meluco with their possessions, many of them by foot. For those who have not fled, the danger is even higher. Not only are insurgent attacks ongoing, but traders and government workers who might have provided food for people in the targeted villages were among the first to leave. With no government support, according to another local source, people who stayed are “starving.” To prevent starvation, pro-government forces will almost certainly have to divert troops from other operations to carry out civilian protection missions in Meluco district.
Government Response
People in northern Cabo Delgado lost power on 12 January after what the Mozambican national electric company called an “anomaly” temporarily knocked out the electrical substation at Awasse, Mocimboa da Praia district. The Awasse substation had been a major site of insurgent sabotage when the insurgency controlled Mocimboa da Praia district, but there is no indication as yet that there was any foul play involved in the latest outage.
A year-end report from Mozambique’s Education Ministry estimated that 123,000 students missed school directly due to the conflict last year. Despite the dire educational situation, it did improve last year. At the start of 2021, the Ministry reported, 385 schools in Cabo Delgado were closed due to the conflict (of which 43 had been destroyed by insurgent action). By the end of the year, however, that number was down to 219, a development that the Ministry ascribed to an improving security situation in the province. The report also said that some 1,600 displaced teachers have returned to teaching in their host communities, an indication of the slow but steady progress the government has made in recuperating the human capital it lost due to the mass displacement caused by the conflict.
Less heartening is the news that 190 people died of malaria in Cabo Delgado in the last two weeks of December. Overall, malaria cases in the province increased 21% year on year. Health experts point to the low standard of living available to displaced Mozambicans as the main cause of the spike. The health ministry worries that the situation will become worse as the rainy season begins in earnest, offering mosquitos more areas in which to spawn.
The governor of Niassa province visited displaced people living in Mecula town last week, and received a chilly reception. Insurgent attacks near Mecula began in November, but the provincial government is just now beginning to stand up its humanitarian apparatus to support the nearly 4,000 people now staying in the town. The governor promised that agricultural inputs would be made available to help displaced people support themselves, but with insurgents operating so close to the town, it may be difficult to find people eager to take up a hoe and tend to fields on the edges of town. Indeed, some people have chosen to return to their homes and take their chances with the insurgency rather than stay in Mecula and wait for government support they do not believe will arrive in time.
SAMIM commander Xolani Mankanyi got a warmer reception when he visited Lesotho Defence Force troops in Nangade district last week. The soldiers took part in recent SAMIM offensives against insurgent bases that, according to a SAMIM press release, led to the deaths of 31 insurgents and the recovery of 48 AK-47s and assorted other small arms. Mankayi’s visit seemed timed to offer encouragement to SAMIM forces after SADC took a decision to extend the mission for three months after a short delay.
SADC heads of state met in Lilongwe on 12 January to discuss the situation in Cabo Delgado. They agreed, as expected, to extend the SAMIM deployment, although gave no detail on the envisaged timeframe. Several sources suggest a six month period is expected, although conditions on the ground and available financing will determine how the intervention is tailored. Malawian President Chakwera, the chair of the summit, in his closing remarks reiterated SADC’s commitment to finish the job they had started. It seems unlikely that the mission will be able to move from its current focus on offensive stabilization efforts to a more traditional peacekeeping role. Disappointingly, the communique said nothing about addressing the mission’s obvious capacity deficits in the field which require urgent attention. No mention was made of the Kigali meeting of Rwandan and Mozambican security chiefs earlier that week, which raised eyebrows in some quarters, as well as concerns about lingering disconnects between the SAMIM and Rwandan interventions, and the coordinating role of Maputo.
© 2022 Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED). All rights reserved.