Cabo Ligado Update: 18 September-1 October 2023

By the Numbers: Cabo Delgado, Oct. 2017-Sept. 2023

Figures updated as of 29 September 2023. Political violence includes Battles, Explosions/Remote violence, and Violence against civilians event types. Violence targeting civilians includes Explosions/Remote violence and Violence against civilians event types where civilians are targeted. Fatalities for the two categories thus overlap for certain events. ACLED is a living dataset and figures are subject to change as new information becomes available.

  • Total number of political violence events: 1,690

  • Total number of reported fatalities from political violence: 4,775

  • Total number of reported fatalities from political violence targeting civilians: 2,043

All ACLED data are available for download via the data export tool and curated data files.

Situation Summary

Violence has escalated in the last fortnight across the districts of Mocímboa da Praia and Macomia, the latter of which saw the displacement of several hundred civilians as insurgents tried to force men and women in Pangane village to join their ranks. The incident began on 20 September, when insurgents entered the village, reportedly dressed in military uniform, and attempted to round up around 200 people. This panicked the population and the insurgents ended up abducting approximately 30 locals, including the chief of the fishing community. Local authorities subsequently issued a general order to evacuate the area.

Two International Organization for Migration reports on 23 September said that at least 888 people fled to Quissanga district and the islands of Quirimba and Matemo in Ibo district as a result of the incident. Several boatloads of civilians from Pangane arrived on Quirimbas island two days after the attack, according to a local source. There were reports of casualties but they have not been confirmed.

On 23 September, an improvised explosive device (IED) was triggered on the road between Quiterajo and Cobre in Macomia by an armored patrol vehicle, reportedly belonging to the Southern African Development Community Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM), a local source told Cabo Ligado. There were no reported casualties and Islamic State (IS) claimed responsibility for the attack. IS also claimed to have detonated another IED on an armored patrol vehicle on the road between Mbau and Limala in Mocímboa da Praia on the same day, but a local source claimed it was safely exploded by a bomb disposal team.

IS claimed responsibility for three more IED attacks on patrol vehicles last week. Two of the incidents claimed were on the road between Mucojo and Quiterajo in Macomia district. Neither could be confirmed, though one source said that there were SAMIM operations in that area at the time, which uncovered a small number of IEDs. The location for the second claim was Unidade village, close to Quiterajo. The third claim was for an IED at Marere in southern Mocímboa da Praia on Friday, 29 September. Being remote incidents, confirming the incidents may be as great a challenge for IS as it is for others, as controlled explosions of uncovered IEDs may be mistaken for successful deployment. These claims, and other confirmed incidents in recent weeks, point to the increasing importance of IEDs to the group at this point. 

Limala was also the scene of a clash between insurgents and Rwanda Security Forces (RSF) on 26 September. IS acknowledged the incident in its newspaper al-Naba, reporting that light and medium weapons were used but there were no confirmed casualties on either side. Following the battle, insurgents were likely driven east and arrived in Calugo village in Mocímboa da Praia later that day. Local sources said that insurgents warned villagers not to collaborate with the military and fired their weapons into the air to intimidate the locals, prompting many to flee. There are also unconfirmed reports that insurgents appeared in nearby Marere village at the same time.

Three days later, insurgents went to Ulo village, just 10 kilometers south of Mocímboa da Praia town, warned locals to leave immediately and threatened them with violence. Some civilians were savagely beaten, according to Integrity Magazine. One source told Cabo Ligado that locals from Ibo began arriving in Mocímboa da Praia town on foot and by boat that night, and the village is now mostly empty, despite assurances from RSF.

Focus: Insurgent Activity in Southern Mocímboa da Praia

Six years since the conflict began, insurgents remain active in Mocímboa da Praia district, and in the Mbau Administrative Post area in particular. Securing the district was one of the RSF’s primary objectives upon arrival in July 2021, and one that remains to be fulfilled. Though significantly reduced, their continuing presence in the south of the district is notable. Broadly under great pressure, they are willing to take on RSF at a sensitive time, with municipal elections due 11 October, and TotalEnergies considering lifting force majeure on its liquefied natural gas (LNG)  project before the end of the year. 

Sources on last week’s clash between IS Mozambique (ISM) indicate that ISM came worse out of this rare clash with intervention forces. ISM prefers encounters with Mozambique’s own Defense and Security Forces (FDS). However, the discovery of an IED on the Mbau-Limala road indicates that this was not a chance encounter, but part of a pattern of deliberate targeting of RSF. The road running east of Mbau links the RSF base to southeast Mocímboa da Praia. Limala, approximately 13 km east of Mbau, is thought to be the location of an RSF outpost. 

This activity is not unprecedented. For 2023, up to 29 September, ACLED records 11 political violence events in the Mbau Administrative Post area involving ISM. This compares to 5 such events last year, and might even surpass the figure of 15 for 2021 by the end of the year.  The recent use of IEDs in the Mbau area is not new either. The first use of an IED recorded by ACLED was on 12 September 2021, on the Mbau-Limala road. 

Mbau has been of strategic importance for the insurgents since the early days of the insurgency. With a sparse population, and little infrastructure, the area has provided a safe haven since 2018. Prior to international intervention, the village itself was controlled by the insurgents. After securing Mocímboa da Praia town in August 2021, RSF's next objective was to retake Mbau, which it claimed that same month. 

The failure to control the Mbau area has real impacts on people’s lives. The killing of 10 villagers in Naquitengue on 14 September is the clearest manifestation of that. Many consequently feel it safer to flee the area and head to Mocímboa da Praia town, to which multiple sources have testified in the past fortnight.

Recent events present a risk to the municipal elections to be held on 11 October 2023. At the least, they have likely heightened the rhetoric that links FDS to ISM, as was claimed at a political rally last week. Certainly, security patrols within the town have been stepped up as the elections approach.

However, it is doubtful if trouble in Mbau presents a risk to TotalEnergies’s desire to lift force majeure on the LNG project by the end of the year, as stated by Paul Pouyanné last week. The report it commissioned from Rufin earlier this year understated the levels of violence in the district, and it may suit the company to ignore the current outbreak in isolated Mbau. 

Round-Up

ADF under pressure in DRC

Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni claimed on 23 September that senior Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) commander, Meddie Nkalubo, had been killed in a Uganda Peoples’ Defence Force (UPDF) airstrike on an ADF position in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). UPDF has been conducting operations against ADF since last year. 

According to analyst Dino Mahtani, UPDF’s operations are putting ADF, the core of the IS Central Africa Province, under considerable pressure, tempting some of the leadership to consider handing themselves in. 

ADF has had relations with its counterparts in Mozambique since the early years of the insurgency. It is not clear what impact their defeat would have on ISM, though the prospect of a split in the ADF leadership under such circumstances will likely encourage the continued targeting of ISM leadership in Mozambique. 

TotalEnergies and ExxonMobil to restart Cabo Delgado LNG projects soon

Two energy giants, TotalEnergies and ExxonMobil, are expected to restart operations on their LNG projects in Cabo Delgado province, which were suspended in April 2021 following the insurgent attack on Palma. TotalEnergies said it expected to resume work on its project before the end of the year, while Mozambique’s petroleum regulator, National Petroleum Institute, reported that ExxonMobil aims to resume its own Rovuma LNG project, on the same site at Afungi, “very soon” now that security conditions are satisfactory.

New minister for the interior tours Cabo Delgado

Mozambique’s new Minister of the Interior Pascoal Ronda undertook a four-day trip to Cabo Delgado in September, visiting Pemba, Palma, Metuge, and Quissanga districts. He met with government officials, including the leadership of the provincial police command, and claimed there were good relations between security forces and the local population, despite Cabo Ligado reports to the contrary. 

Correction: An earlier version of this update stated the third IED claim at Marere in southern Mocímboa da Praia was on Monday, 2 October. It has been corrected to clarify that it was Friday, 29 September.

© 2023 Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED). All rights reserved.

Previous
Previous

Cabo Ligado Update: 2-15 October 2023

Next
Next

Cabo Ligado Update: 4-17 September 2023