Cabo Ligado Monthly: September 2022
September At A Glance
Vital Stats
ACLED recorded 33 organized political violence events in Cabo Delgado province in September, resulting in 92 reported fatalities
Reported fatalities were highest in Macomia district, where insurgents carried out attacks on civilians and clashed with state forces and communal militias
Other events took place in Nangade, Muidumbe, Mocímboa da Praia, Chiure, Meluco, Metuge, and Quissanga districts in Cabo Delgado
Vital Trends
Insurgents make second incursion into Nampula province, killing 18 people overall
Security forces launch operation against insurgent hideouts in Nangade district
President Filipe Nyusi again offers amnesty to insurgents, during public presentation of surrendered fighters
In This Report
Cabo Delgado after Frelimo’s 12th Congress
President Samia in Maputo
Insurgents’ resilience in Nangade district
Researching and reporting the conflict
September Situation Summary
Compared to August, September saw a decrease in organized political violence events, but an increase in fatalities. This reflects the scale and significance of incidents in Macomia district in central Cabo Delgado, and Nangade district in the north.
In Macomia, a major assault was made on a Defense and Security Forces (FDS) outpost in the deserted village of Nkoe on 15 September. Conflicting reports indicate that between five and 16 lives were lost in the attack. In Nangade the following day, FDS and Southern African Development Community (SADC) Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) forces launched an aerial and ground assault on insurgent hideouts in forested areas in the northeast of the district. In one clash, insurgents destroyed two SAMIM vehicles, in an incident promoted widely in Islamic State (IS) media channels. Just a week later, and approximately 30 km south of that operation, insurgents attacked a police outpost at Namuembe in the south of Nangade, forcing the officers to flee.
Elsewhere, civilians bore the brunt of insurgent violence. Insurgents carried out attacks in Erati and Memba districts of Nampula province, killing 18 civilians overall in their first incursion into the province since June this year. They subsequently returned north via Metuge and Quissanga in Cabo Delgado with security forces in pursuit.
In political developments, the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs, Josep Borrell announced support for both the Rwandan and SADC military deployments in the province during his visit last month. Later in the month, President Filipe Nyusi made his first visit to Mocímboa da Praia since the election campaign in October 2019, and yet again offered amnesty to insurgents who turn themselves in. Speaking to a much smaller crowd than three years ago, he gave no explanation of how this should work in practice.
Cabo Delgado after Frelimo’s 12th Congress
By Fernando Lima, Cabo Ligado
Mozambique expects to hear good news during next week’s visit of TotalEnergies CEO, Patrick Pouyanné to Maputo. Government sources believe the outcome of the 12th Frelimo Congress, consolidating the powers of President Nyusi and the international pressure for additional gas supply, particularly from Europe, are encouraging TotalEnergies to reevaluate the security situation in Cabo Delgado. Gas exploration works in Cabo Delgado led by the French multinational were suspended in April 2021, following an attack at Palma on 24 March, a town 10 km away from the Afungi camp where TotalEnergies has its main operational base.
Frelimo’s congress, held between 23 and 27 September, was a good one for President Nyusi. He managed to be elected unanimously as President of Frelimo by congress delegates. That result was never in doubt, so perhaps more important is that he now has a much friendlier Political Commission within the party. The 19 member Political Commission is the most powerful political body in the party, if not the country, since it rules on which matters are taken to the cabinet. The Political Commission is the executive body of the 150 member Central Committee and is elected by that body.
Last year, prior to the intervention of the SADC forces, President Nyusi faced opposition to foreign military intervention within the Political Commission, which insisted on limiting international support to training and military equipment for the FDS. President Nyusi outmaneuvered his political opponents, by flying almost in secret to Kigali in April to obtain the support for intervention from Rwandan President Paul Kagame, and to Paris in May to see President Emmanuel Macron. Two months later, Rwanda deployed an initial contingent of 1,000 troops to fight the insurgency in Cabo Delgado. Nyusi’s strengthened decision-making capacity after the September congress will give him greater authority in the planning and control of the military operations against the armed insurgency in Cabo Delgado, in which he is directly involved.
His strengthened position underscores the optimism being expressed internationally by the administration. Max Tonela, the new Finance Minister, attending the autumn International Monetary Fund (IMF) meeting in Washington, was quoted as expecting a decision by TotalEnergies by the end of March 2023.
There are additional factors contributing to Mozambique’s optimism for an early restart of the gas operations in the Afungi area. Tanzania’s President Samia Suluhu Hassan’s visit in September was considered “very positive” from a military point of view, according to sources. Mozambican officials expect a significant improvement on the Tanzanian performance in the Nangade area, at this point the main focus of insurgents’ activity in the northwest part of Cabo Delgado. Local authorities had repeatedly voiced their disappointment over the performance of Tanzania People’s Defence Force (TPDF) in Nangade, for not taking a more aggressive operational stance in the district.
Furthermore, four units of Mozambican special forces trained by EU Training Mission in Mozambique (EUTM) are now present in Cabo Delgado, reinforcing the national capabilities on the joint operations against the insurgents. The two year training program aims to prepare 11 companies of special forces, involving 1,100 recruits.
Despite the improvements, there are a number of recent events which could trigger reticence on the part of the investors in Cabo Delgado gas reserves. After a successful military offensive in the major strongholds of the insurgency at the northern part of Macomia district, the Mozambican security forces and its international allies were not able to prevent a series of attacks in the southern part of the province in June, bringing the violence to the districts of Ancuabe and Chiure in the south of the province. Those attacks forced a new flood of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and disrupted graphite projects and a solar energy plant in the area. In September, an insurgent unit crossed the Lúrio river and launched attacks on villages in Memba and Erati districts, adding Nampula province as a conflict zone. Despite the military situation now being under control in Nampula, military analysts believe that a spectacular operation, like an attack against a district capital could reverse a potential positive answer from Total Energies to resume operations.
Nevertheless, government officials privately admit the French company will be willing to review the security situation in Cabo Delgado. Pouyanné’s visit is part of the plan which also includes an audit of the security situation in Mozambique. This may require it recognizing the insurgency as an endemic factor and accepting stability in key districts such as Palma and Mocímboa da Praia as adequate for the project.
Besides the military element, the new political leadership elected at Frelimo congress must address the complementary civilian challenges posed by the conflict. The Northern Integrated Development Agency (ADIN), charged with reconstruction is making little progress whilst deradicalization and reintegration programs to counter extremist Islamist sects remain a fiction. Members of the newly elected Frelimo Central Committee coming from Cabo Delgado expressed strong dissatisfaction about how civil and humanitarian operations are being handled in the province.
Determined to demonstrate a return to normality, the Mozambican government insists that thousands of displaced people have returned safely to Palma and Mocímboa da Praia while getting training and financial support to develop small businesses. At the Afungi site, things are ready for a fresh restart. Sources say a South African contractor has finished a defensive wall around the complex and new permanent premises for a military contingent expected to be deployed in the area. The port of Mocímboa da Praia received its first cargo since it fell to the insurgents in 2020, including equipment to restart its regular operations and support the natural gas project. Further south, the first shipment of liquefied natural gas (LNG) produced at the Coral floating base is about to be sent to Europe, much to the EU’s Joseph Borrell’s satisfaction.
President Samia in Maputo
By Erick Kabendera, King’s College London
President Samia Suluhu Hassan arrived in Maputo on the night of 20 September for a three day visit. Flying in directly from the funeral of the British monarch Elizabeth II, she chose to attend Frelimo’s 12th Congress over the United Nations General Assembly that was also being held that week in New York. The congress celebrated the 60th anniversary of the party’s founding in Dar es Salaam. Tanzanian support was critical in the war of independence, and has shaped relations between the countries since. Her visit, focusing on security issues but anchored in Frelimo celebrations, sought to shore up relations, disturbed by the five year conflict in northern Mozambique.
Some progress has been made. During the visit, the then Minister for Defense Stergomena Tax signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on defense and cooperation with her Mozambican counterpart Cristóvão Chume. The document will not likely reverse the arm’s length position that Tanzania has taken to the conflict: authorities are keen to avoid being embroiled in a permanent security nightmare. The MoU is just one indication of improved relations. Defense ministers met in Maputo in August. President Samia’s visit came two weeks after Mozambique’s Chief of General Staff, Admiral Joaquin Rivas Mangrasse visited Dar es Salaam for talks with his Tanzanian counterpart General Jacob Paul Mkunda, as well as Minister Tax. Following her visit, Tax and other officials remained in Maputo for a three-day meeting of the Permanent Joint Commission on Defense and Security where formal agreements on intelligence sharing and military training were signed.
Prior to this, the only agreements to arise from the conflict were MoUs between the countries’ police forces signed in 2018 and 2020. With the increased role of the TPDF in southern Tanzania, and its role in SAMIM, these agreements will serve to strengthen existing cooperation on protection of their shared 800 km of land and marine border.
This represents a significant change in Tanzania’s approach to the conflict compared to her predecessor. President Samia’s visit was considered critical in restoring historical ties between the two countries, which were weakened under President John Magufuli. In early 2017, according to diplomatic sources, President Nyusi tried at least three times to request a state visit to Tanzania. When he eventually visited Tanzania, on December 14 that year, President Magufuli acknowledged Nyusi’s concerns that the insurgents were moving between the two countries. According to sources, President Magufuli pointed out that Tanzania had dealt with the problem single-handedly without seeking foreign support, and told the Mozambicans to deal with the problem themselves. Tanzania had mounted a military operation in May 2017 in Kibiti district, 120 km south of Dar es Salaam, against an armed group that had been targeting local government officials and police. Some of the insurgents fled to northern Mozambique where they launched attacks in 2017. The insurgents’ connections to Tanzania and President Magufuli’s dismissive approach to President Nyusi created much mistrust of Tanzania in Maputo.
Mistrust in Maputo was later matched by suspicion in Dar es Salaam. Mozambique’s decision to invite Rwanda to provide troops, following President Nyusi’s meetings with President Macron of France and President Kagame of Rwanda, raised eyebrows in Dar es Salaam. In Tanzania’s security and diplomatic circles, it was feared that Mozambique was overlooking its neighbor in favor of Rwanda. In addition to threatening Tanzania’s historic relationship with Mozambique, the presence of Rwandan troops along its southern border raised security concerns. Rwanda’s military deployment was also viewed suspiciously within the SADC bloc, of which Tanzania was a founder. SADC had authorized military intervention of its own in April 2021, but Mozambique did not officially report its arrangements with Rwanda to the bloc.
In this context, Tanzania’s objective has been to stop the conflict spilling over the border, while providing limited support to intervention. Understanding that SADC has limited financial capability to sustain a long-term operation in Mozambique, and with Rwanda’s unknown agenda, Tanzania has sought to maintain limited involvement in the SADC mission while directly engaging the Mozambican government to enhance security cooperation. It remains to be seen if it will lead to a significant change in behavior by Tanzanian troops in Cabo Delgado.
This is a delicate balancing act, as Tanzania has a significant troop presence on both sides of the border. TPDF troops have long been deployed in the south, a presence that has increased as the insurgency grew. They are now also on the Mozambican side of the border in Nangade district as part of the SAMIM deployment. Whether it will allow for a quiet, security oriented approach to the conflict as undertaken in Tanzania remains to be seen.
This is not the first time the two countries have cooperated militarily. Southern Tanzania was a rear base for the Mozambican war of independence against the Portuguese between 1964 and 1974. Frelimo also received military support from former Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere during the civil war with Renamo. Tanzania contributed at least 2,000 troops to fight and provide training to the Mozambicans. This was reciprocated. Mozambique contributed one battalion to Tanzania during the war with Uganda in 1979. President Samia did not mention that in her speech at the Frelimo congress, preferring to stress Mozambique’s historical reliance on Tanzania.
Recent ministerial changes will not affect Tanzania’s approach to the conflict. While the removal of Liberata Mulamula as Minister for Foreign Affairs and East African Cooperation was unexpected, her replacement by Stergomena Tax will provide some continuity given Tax’s eight years as SADC’s Executive Secretary. Perhaps more important will be the seemingly growing relationship between the two countries’ militaries. Tanzania will rely on this to reiterate to Mozambique the importance of their bilateral relationship.
Insurgents’ Resilience in Nangade District
By Peter Bofin and Piers Pigou, Cabo Ligado
Bordering Tanzania to the north, and the districts of Palma to the east, and Mocímboa da Praia to the east and south, Nangade district is of considerable strategic importance at this stage of the insurgency. The district is thinly populated, with just under 90,000 people over 3,000 square km. With little infrastructure, and densely forested, the district became a fall back position for the insurgents following the arrival of Rwandan forces in July 2021. Subsequently, Nangade has become an increasingly significant site for the insurgents. By May 2021, they were known to have a base in heavily forested lands near Nkonga village, in the southeast of the district. Operations undertaken by SAMIM and FDS forces in September approximately 12 km north of Nkonga suggest they were also encamped near Namiune and Ngongo villages. ACLED data from the district for September and the preceding two months provide a useful frame for examining aspects of the conflict. We see the respective roles of local, national, and international security forces, and gain insight into insurgents’ ambitions, locations, and relationships with local communities.
While originally a fall back position and transit route, insurgents have done more than hide in Nangade. They have clashed with four armed forces: troops deployed with SAMIM from TPDF and Lesotho Defence Force (LDF); Mozambique Defense Armed Forces (FADM); the Mozambique police Rapid Intervention Unit (UIR), and the paramilitary Local Forces.
The number of organized political violence events in the district recorded by ACLED increased considerably since the intervention of foreign troops in July 2021, from an average of at least six per month over 2021, to an average of over 11 per month during the first nine months of 2022. These consist of violence against civilians, as well as remote violence and battles with the security forces and paramilitary Local Forces operating in the district, and do not count incidents that consist solely of looting and property destruction which mostly affect civilians and are the main source of basic supplies for the insurgents. In the past quarter, however, over 50% of organized political violence events in Nangade have been clashes between insurgents and the military and paramilitary forces.
While engaging with all forces, the insurgents have offensively targeted Mozambican police and army. In doing so they have repeatedly engaged with security forces in built up areas, including on the edge of Nangade district headquarters itself. Most attacks were to the south of Nangade town, on settlements on the only road to Mueda, and to the east against military outposts close to suspected camps around Nkonga. These attacks, and concerns about the risk these bases present to eastern districts of Palma and Mocímboa da Praia, likely led to September’s joint SAMIM/FDS operations against insurgent bases east of Nangade town between Namiune in the north and Nkonga further south.
July this year saw two attacks on an FADM base at Mandimba in northeast Nangade, along the main transit route to Pundanhar in western Palma district. A large UIR contingent abandoned the town in the face of an insurgent assault, also in July.
August saw another assault on Mandimba, a raid on a UIR outpost in Litingina, just 16 km south of Nangade town, and an attack on an FADM base in Ntamba in the south of the district. September saw another assault on a UIR outpost at Namuembe village.
Other clashes with security forces were recorded in settlements to the south and southeast of Nangade town. In July, insurgents clashed with SAMIM and FDS on the edges of Nangade town, and with a SAMIM patrol in Chibau just seven km to the south. In August, they again clashed with FDS and Local Forces at Litingina, Nambedo, and Namuembe.
The insurgents’ ability to go on the offensive has its roots in the lack of coordination between Rwandan forces in Palma and Mocímboa da Praia districts and SAMIM in Nangade. In February 2022, insurgents were driven out of Palma by Rwandan forces westwards into Nangade where they faced no coordinated actions from SAMIM or Mozambican forces. This may reflect SAMIM’s operational posture in Nangade. SAMIM has often been criticized in Nangade for not taking a proactive approach in fulfilling its mandate, especially in terms of rapid response. This was raised publicly by SAMIM Force Commander Major General Xolani Mankanyi in May, when he urged the contingent to “be more offensive, as the best way of defense is to launch more attacks.” Their ability to repeatedly attack sites along R763 running south of Nangade town was still in evidence through July and August, and even after the September operations against the insurgents when a UIR base was attacked at Namuembe.
Patterns of incidents over the past three months indicate that while the insurgents’ move into Nangade was to avoid Rwandan operations in the first months of intervention, they have not been forced to remain “on the run.” In the past three months they have been strategic in attacking settlements along the main road and targeting military outposts across the district. This has enabled reprovisioning of weapons, ammunition, and food. Routing insurgent strongholds in the district remains a key challenge for security forces in the months ahead. They seem to have been resilient in resisting FDS/SAMIM operations against them in mid-September with the ambush of SAMIM vehicles, and a successful assault on a UIR outpost at Namuembe further south within days of the SAMIM operation.
Ensuring that current operations do not simply displace the problem will depend on improved operational coordination between forces. As insurgents are unlikely to move to the more fortified areas of Palma and Mocímboa da Praia, this will place heavy demands on FDS and SAMIM to track small groups, or individual fighters in their areas of responsibility. To the north, Tanzania lies just across the border where it has a strong military presence, though some may decide to lie low there. The more likely routes lie to the Messalo river area in Macomia, Muidumbe, Mueda, and Meluco districts, which continue to provide a level of sanctuary to insurgents. Their ability to regroup in Nangade and remain strategically focused in the wake of effective Rwandan operations in the east indicates the scale of the challenge they will continue to present.
Instability in Nangade has frustrated efforts to address the humanitarian challenges. Although many IDPs fleeing from Palma in the wake of the town’s takeover by insurgents in March 2021 fled via Nangade, many passed through onto Mueda and beyond and for a variety of reasons; not least as they were encouraged to do so by local security forces. An uptick in attacks in the district from January to mid-March 2022 saw 34,000 Nangade residents, over a third of the district population, displaced. Over 29,000 sought refuge within Nangade and a further 5,000 heading to Mueda. The population of Nangade town itself doubled in this period. Although power was restored to the town in September 2021 after a year without, the town has not returned to any semblance of normality. The population remains dependent on irregular support from humanitarian agencies, while the town, its environs and transit routes to and from it remain vulnerable to attack..
Researching and Reporting the Conflict
By Tom Gould, Cabo Ligado
Conducting field research, or undertaking journalism, in any active conflict zone poses a number of obvious logistical and security challenges, and Cabo Delgado is no different. The danger of attacks, which is present in most districts, places physical restrictions on where one can travel. Those that do venture out into the province risk falling foul of often overzealous security forces, even with proper research permits or journalistic credentials. These challenges have led many researchers and journalists to adopt innovative methods for gathering information about the conflict and its impact without having to visit in person.
According to Yussuf Adam, an associate professor at the University of Eduardo Mondlane in Maputo, the main difficulties for researchers such as himself are “material problems like funds, cars, translators and authorizations.” These authorizations can be particularly hard to procure for foreign researchers who must first apply for the appropriate work visa, which are issued at the discretion of the scrutiny-shy Mozambican government. Consequently, many researchers travel to Cabo Delgado on tourist visas, which may trigger suspicions at police checkpoints which are unavoidable on all the main roads leading out of the provincial capital of Pemba. Therefore, researchers or journalists that opt for this route tend not to leave Pemba, limiting the scope of research.
Traveling across the province is also complicated by the need for armed military escorts in districts such as Macomia and Mocímboa da Praia. These escorts are not usually free. Local sources say that security forces may extort bribes before allowing vehicles to proceed to their destination. Much of Palma is effectively inaccessible without the cooperation of organizations such as the United Nations and TotalEnergies which operate planes between Pemba and Palma town. Humanitarian agencies need to maintain relations with the authorities, while TotalEnergies would like to avoid complicating operations with actors they cannot control with one source saying that TotalEnergies is particularly reluctant to carry journalists.
The government is generally hostile to researchers and journalists looking to cover the conflict. Several have been detained in the past, including Amade Abubacar, who was held for three months in 2019 after being arrested while interviewing displaced people. Despite his release, the charges have not been dropped and the case is currently in the appeal phase which will determine whether or not it goes to trial. His case is not unique. In December 2018, the military detained investigative journalist Estacio Valoi, Amnesty International researcher David Matsinhe, and their driver, holding them for two days and confiscating their cameras, computers, and phones.
However, technology, in particular open source information, has enabled researchers to gather unique insights into the conflict from a distance. Several of these innovations were presented at the Institute for Economic Studies (IESE) conference in Maputo in September. Giulia Barletta from the University of Copenhagen has mapped changes in nighttime lights (NTL) from satellite observations against ACLED data and the multidimensional poverty index to measure the destruction of homes and infrastructure. Barletta found that NTL tended to diminish in conflict affected areas while they remained largely stable in the rest of the province. This can assist both conflict researchers in confirming the impact of violent incidents and humanitarian organizations in facilitating “prompt and targeted intervention and aid provision,” Barletta concluded.
Bill Kondracki from Cordillera Applications Group presented a new analysis of the Battle of Palma in March 2021, which uses commercial phone data to track insurgent movements. Phone towers log apps that trigger a geolocation and that data can be bought and used to extrapolate where insurgents were carrying out reconnaissance prior to the attack. Insights such as this are indicative of the power of open source intelligence, which is still a relatively nascent field, but is already providing valuable alternatives to field research.
Journalists too need to be creative in order to mitigate the risks they face. Secure chat applications such as WhatsApp and Telegram allow them to remain in touch with contacts across the province. If used properly, this can provide them, and their sources, with considerable security. They also need to rely on a wider range of accessible open source information when official channels are closed, or people are reluctant to speak to them. No app though will replace Cabo Delgado journalists’ skills in language and understanding of local context, where skills in Macua, Makonde, Mwani, and Swahili languages are often more useful than Portuguese. Their traditional journalistic skills of triangulation and verification are becoming more important in identifying seemingly multi-sourced reports that are simply recirculation of the original report through different channels, an increasing problem due to restrictions on access to information.