Cabo Ligado Monthly: November 2023
November At A Glance
Vital Stats
ACLED records eight political violence events in Cabo Delgado in November, resulting in at least 11 reported fatalities, with events occurring in Macomia, Mocímboa da Praia, Muidumbe, and Metuge districts
One IED explosion was recorded in Mocímboa da Praia district
Over 1,500 people were displaced by attacks or fear of attack in Macomia and Muidumbe districts
Vital Trends
Political violence, and related fatalities, remain at a low level
Insurgent group ISM’s IED capacity remains intact
ISM re-establish camps on the Messalo river
In This Report
UN Special Rapporteur on displacement in northern Mozambique
The tortuous road to dialogue in Cabo Delgado
The social and economic costs of the conflict
November Situation Summary
Political violence in November was again concentrated in Macomia, Mocímboa da Praia, and Muidumbe districts, with one isolated incident in Metuge district. The three most significant events took place over 12 days, with a series of attacks perpetrated by Islamic State Mozambique (ISM) in a triangle of territory straddling the Messalo river in Macomia, Mócimboa da Praia, and Muidumbe districts.
On 10 November, ISM attacked the village of Novo Cabo Delgado in northern Macomia district, killing at least three people. Local Forces from Novo Cabo Delgado, Litandacua, and Miangalewa villages eventually repelled the attack. On 16 November, ISM attacked Mapate village, less than 25 kilometers west of Novo Cabo Delgado in Muidumbe district. They killed at least two civilians, and were once again confronted by Local Forces. Finally, on 22 November, ISM attacked Antadora village, over 35 km east of Mapate in Mocímboa da Praia district. There were no reported fatalities. The following day, Local Forces moved against ISM camps on the Messalo river.
These attacks indicate that ISM has managed to re-establish camps along the Messalo river, and that in these areas, the first line of defense remains the Local Forces. The return to Messalo is a recent development. Movements south into Quissanga district that began in October, were likely an attempt to avoid Operation Golpe Duro in Catupa forest district before crossing the N380 westwards, and moving north to the Messalo river basin.
With this small number of incidents, and fatalities, ISM continues to disrupt lives considerably. The International Organisation for Migration records that 1,546 people were displaced due to insurgent activity in northern Macomia alone between 10 and 14 November.
UN Special Rapporteur on Displacement in Northern Mozambique
By Peter Bofin, Cabo Ligado
The United Nations Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internally displaced persons (IDPs) Paula Gaviria Betancur concluded a two-week visit to Mozambique in November. Her end-of-mission statement is a comprehensive overview of the challenges facing IDPs, and those charged with serving them. Betancur visited Cabo Delgado and Sofala provinces, with much of her statement focusing on issues relating to the conflict. Key elements of her report were sections on the return process, sexual exploitation and abuse, and access to justice.
On return, Betancur questioned whether people’s decisions to return were fully informed or not. She noted that the government claims most returns to be “voluntary and self-organised,” while also referring to reports that local authorities and community leaders have pressured people to return, promising humanitarian aid or misrepresenting the situation in people’s places of origin. While she correctly points to the improved security situation as being a fundamental factor for return, she is aware of the pressures on IDPs, for whom humanitarian assistance has been falling. This echoes the findings of the Rural Environment Observatory (OMR) in June 2023, which noted that return to secure areas was often self-funded, and partly driven by poor conditions in IDP centers. To illustrate the strength of these push factors, Betancur quotes one informant who told her “I would rather get shot farming, than dying of hunger.”
Betancur raises an important point about the role of armed forces, both the Defense Armed Forces of Mozambique (FADM), as well as foreign intervention forces in facilitating return. The first wave of return to Mocímboa da Praia was facilitated by FADM and the Rwanda Defence Force. Betancur points out that such support violates the principles of “neutrality, distinction, and precaution.” In international humanitarian law, distinction is the imperative to be able to distinguish between parties to a conflict, and the civilian population. Similarly, precaution refers to the imperative to not put civilian populations at risk. Facilitation of return by armed forces clearly raises such a threat. Betancur argues that the involvement of conflict actors in humanitarian operations threatens the neutrality of other humanitarian actors, and thereby puts them at risk.
The Special Rapporteur’s remarks on sexual abuse by the armed forces stood out, particularly as it is an area of the conflict that has been largely underreported. The most comprehensive study of the issue so far, conducted in 2021, is careful to refer simply to ‘armed actors’ or ‘armed combatants’. Only the contrasting term in the study, ‘non-state armed actors’ suggests that the terms refer to state forces. Betancur reports that she heard in focus group discussions of members of the armed forces engaging in rape and non-consensual relationships with adults and children, and resulting unwanted pregnancies. She also highlighted the impunity perpetrators enjoy, noting that victims “are often then revictimized as they may encounter their perpetrator in public spaces (such as the marketplace or machambas).” She recommends mandatory training for both Mozambican and international forces on these issues, as well as the establishment of mechanisms of accountability.
Data on this issue are not readily available, though a number of organizations are working on gender based violence in northern Mozambique as part of the Mozambique Protection Cluster. Reports from the cluster indicate that prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse is a priority, but do not provide data on patterns of sexual exploitation and abuse.
On access to justice, Betancur addresses a range of issues, including the acute need for civil documentation critical for the recovery of housing, land, and property by returnees. She also notes breakdowns in the justice system and how it deals with those coming out of the insurgency. On the one hand, she notes the lack of transitional justice processes for fighters responding to President Filipe Nyusi’s offers of amnesty, in order to address communities' real fears of receiving such people. On the other hand, she notes that children liberated from the insurgency, as well as their carers, are then held in state detention for long periods, likely adding to the traumas they have experienced.
The Special Rapporteur’s comprehensive end-of-mission statement will be followed by a final report to be presented at the UN’s Human Rights Council in June 2024. Further detail on these issues can be expected then.
The Tortuous Road to Dialogue in Cabo Delgado
By Tomás Queface, Cabo Ligado
The president of the Islamic Council of Mozambique (CISLAMO), Sheikh Aminuddin Muhammad, announced recently that an “international commission” is finalizing its efforts to hold a dialogue with insurgents in Cabo Delgado to end the conflict that has been going on since 2017. This commission is expected to start work in January 2024, he says, and will include civil society organizations from Mozambique and the region, and individuals from European countries. He recently confirmed these remarks to Cabo Ligado. There is little public information about this commission, its actual composition, and the strategies it will adopt to end the conflict in Cabo Delgado. The pressing question is how far this initiative can achieve its stated goals in an environment as challenging as Cabo Delgado.
Since the beginning of the conflict in 2017, several initiatives have been launched to encourage dialogue in communities, interfaith exchanges, and international initiatives. The military strategy has helped to contain the insurgency and reduce its capacity to some extent, but it has not destroyed it. Dialogue initiatives, however, have established mechanisms for dialogue with local civil society organizations, and provincial and police authorities, without involving the main actors in the conflict.
Could the initiative announced by the President of CISLAMO be more successful than the previous attempts and thus represent a turning point in the conflict? Officially, the government isn't talking about dialogue. On the contrary, it is in favor of a military response and has called for the surrender of the insurgents and a return to normal life. However, the fate of those insurgents who have been captured or surrendered is unknown. The absence of a clear government policy on the reintegration of former insurgent combatants is not a positive sign of the government's openness to reconciliation.
The killing of Ibn Omar was a victory for the government, but it also removed one of the most important interlocutors for possible dialogue. There is currently a lack of clarity within the insurgency as to the leadership that will be in a position to negotiate the terms of both dialogue and an end to the conflict. There has been much speculation about the current composition of the rebel leadership, with names such as Farido and Quadrado surfacing, but little is known of their role. Similarly, would the Mozambican government be interested in dialogue if the death of Ibn Omar and several other insurgent leaders and the weakening of the insurgency gave the government the upper hand?
The idea of creating an environment for dialogue stems from the fact that the military route can take time. Dialogue can open the way to understanding the real causes of the conflict and build bridges between the different actors. Some insurgents are known locally and interact with the communities during their incursions. According to sources in Cabo Delgado, some people detained in connection with the insurgency have valuable information for understanding their motivations and can serve as a bridge for establishing local initiatives to resolve the conflict.
According to some sources who spoke to Cabo Ligado, dialogue initiatives should not be limited to the government and insurgents. It should begin at the community level to identify the causes and motivations behind the insurgency, so that conditions can be created not only for dialogue but also for improving people's lives. In Cabo Delgado, a number of initiatives to involve community and religious leaders are already underway. One of them has been proposed by the International Centre for Dialogue (KAICIID), which is trying to establish a peaceful co-existence through inter-religious dialogue. Another approach, undertaken by the Masc Foundation, is the “Strengthening Peace and Social Cohesion" initiative, which aims to take into account the proposals of young people and women for local development and to involve them in decision-making processes. Such initiatives, which make it possible to listen to community leaders and lay the foundations for both dialogue and reconciliation, while addressing the main needs of the community, will be fundamental to addressing the underlying causes of the conflict.
The Social and Economic Costs of the Conflict
By Rui Mate, Center for Public Integrity
The conflict in Cabo Delgado has had profound ramifications for the economy. In addition to the violation of human rights and the displacement of more than a million people, the conflict has significantly strained the country's fiscal resources. Between 2018-2022, additional conflict-related national security expenses and lost revenue from the liquefied natural gas (LNG) project totaled approximately 7.75 billion United States dollars. The Center for Public Integrity (CIP) recently undertook a comprehensive analysis of the fiscal impact of the conflict, highlighting not only immediate expenditure, but also the long-term implications and social challenges facing the province. It focused on expenditure on defense and security, and revenue foregone by delays to the LNG project, and the impact on the education sector.
In the years 2018-2022, national security expenditures related to the conflict increased by approximately US$1.69 billion, creating significant pressure on the national budget. CIP’s econometric analysis reveals the bulk of this increase was accounted for by expenditure on state defense forces and police. The former saw an increase in expenditure of over $689 million, while the latter saw an increase of over $950 million. By contrast, expenditure on the State Intelligence and Security Services (SISE) saw only slight increases in expenditure in those years. This suggests that the main drivers of spending on intelligence services are not related to the Cabo Delgado conflict but are influenced by broader political interests and agendas. The significant increase in police expenditure reflects the lead role they have had in the security response in Cabo Delgado.
On the other hand, the conflict has led to both economic and social losses. In economic terms, the most obvious impact has been the delay to the LNG project led by TotalEnergies. Delays caused by the conflict have seen the state foregoing over $6 billion in revenue, according to our analysis. The current market is characterized by high gas prices, further exacerbated by the economic consequences of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. CIP’s calculation is based on a three-year delay from 2021 to 2023. It is based on an actual market scenario with high prices. Recent data from the World Bank shows that the average price of LNG was $12.88 in August 2023. CIP’s analysis indicates that further delays will lead to yet more foregone revenue.
The crisis is not limited to fiscal issues. There are devastating social effects, especially on education and the province's human capital. Cabo Delgado stands out as the only province in Mozambique to witness a decline in literacy rates since the conflict’s onset. Household Budget Surveys conducted by Mozambique’s National Institute of Statistics (INE) in 2020 and 2022 show that there was an 8.7% spike in illiteracy rates over those years in Cabo Delgado province. CIP estimates that this educational shock could result in a relative decline in Cabo Delgado’s output of almost $360 million over that period.
Human rights violations, including sexual exploitation, further worsen the humanitarian crisis. A CIP study from March 2023 revealed how displaced women and girls, mainly aged between 15 and 40, are forced into prostitution due to insufficient humanitarian aid and survival needs. Furthermore, hundreds of women and girls have been abducted by Islamic State Mozambique in Cabo Delgado since 2018, with many remaining in captivity, forced into marriages or sold. These situations worsen the already precarious situation of women in Cabo Delgado.
Despite substantial financial and military contributions from international partners, Mozambique's humanitarian needs remain largely unmet. The Mozambique Humanitarian Response plan had secured just 36.1% of financing coverage of necessary financing by December 2023, creating inequalities in distribution by sector, with significant deficits in coordination in the education, protection, and food security sectors.
The interconnection between fiscal, social, and governance dimensions highlights a vicious cycle in which the economic costs of conflict contribute to social and governance challenges, creating a downward spiral. International aid, focused on military interventions, risks reducing budgets for essential development, generating unpredictable consequences for future generations.
In this sense, to alleviate immediate suffering, face long-term socio-economic challenges, and create the basis for sustainable development, the government of Mozambique and its international partners are recommended to reinforce security measures, practice transparency in expenditure allocation, participatory governance, provide additional funding for humanitarian aid, and implement strong oversight mechanisms.