Cabo Ligado Monthly: November 2022
November At A Glance
Vital Stats
ACLED recorded 35 organized political violence events in Cabo Delgado province in November, resulting in 88 reported fatalities
Reported fatalities were highest in Nangade district, where Southern African Development Community Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) forces clashed with insurgents, and claimed they killed 30 members of the Islamist militia.
Other events took place in Muidumbe, Mocímboa da Praia, Macomia, Namuno, Balama, Meluco, Chiure, Montepuez, and Mueda districts in Cabo Delgado
Vital Trends
Intervention forces continued to engage with insurgents in Nangade
Muidumbe district suffered from insurgent attacks the most
Return continues in the northeast, but challenges remain
In This Report
(In)security, return, and the decision of force majeure
Labor and natural resources conflicts in southern Cabo Delgado
Mocímboa da Praia focus
November Situation Summary
November saw the number of organized political violence events in Cabo Delgado remain steady, compared to October. The number of fatalities, however, saw a notable increase to 88, compared to 73 in October. This was mostly accounted for by 30 insurgent fatalities claimed by the SAMIM arising from ongoing operations in Nangade district. In total, there were two clashes involving insurgents and SAMIM forces operating alongside Mozambique Defense Armed Forces (FADM) across Nangade. This reflects an intensification of operations against insurgents’ encampments, particularly in the east of the district.
Insurgents are believed to be operating from encampments in northern Macomia district, from where they also reached Meluco, Mueda, and Muidumbe districts in November. The greatest number of incidents was in Muidumbe district, which saw 11 organized political violence events. Four of these involved clashes with FADM and Local Forces. Five soldiers reportedly lost their lives in one clash on 28 November. Six events were attacks on civilians.
In Macomia district, eight soldiers were reported to have been killed in two attacks on Nguida village, which for some time has been abandoned and functions as a military outpost. The struggle for control of Nguida was to continue into December. Insurgents were also involved in three organized political violence events in Meluco and Mueda districts. They clashed once with security forces in Meluco, and carried out two incidents of violence against civilians in the two districts.
Further east in southeast Mocímboa da Praia district, insurgents conducted four attacks against civilians, reportedly killing eight people and meeting no response from either FADM or Rwandan troops stationed in the district.
Finally, November saw the insurgents’ sweep through Chiure, Namuno, Balama, and Montepuez districts that began in October begin to peter out. In 10 organized political violence incidents across those districts in November, the only resistance was presented by the emerging Naparama militia, five of whom were beheaded in Montepuez district.
(In)security, Return, and the Decision of Force Majeure
João Feijó, Rural Environment Observatory
In recent months, while Rwandan and Mozambican forces maintain security in Mocímboa da Praia and Palma, uncertainty persists in neighboring districts. The focus of the security response has been to see TotalEnergies resume construction of its liquefied natural gas (LNG) plant at Afungi. Whether the firm will do so depends on the security threat across the province, as well as in the key districts of Mocímboa da Praia and Palma. It is not yet clear what indicators from this complex situation will shape this decision.
Over the last quarter of 2022, we have seen a significant decrease in the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Metuge, Ancuabe, Montepuez, and Mueda, who have moved to Muidumbe and Mocímboa da Praia. From Palma headquarters, displaced people have moved to villages in the administrative posts of Olumbe and Quionga. Reducing pressure on Afungi, TotalEnergies has facilitated the return of IDPs who were living in surrounding villages, such as Quitunda. By the end of November, a humanitarian assessment team estimated that there were 30,000 people in the town of Mocímboa da Praia alone, and as many more in the rest of the district. If these numbers are true, that would equal almost half of the population registered in the 2017 census (123,975 inhabitants).
Many people do not necessarily return to their villages of origin, but to areas closer to their villages, often occupying third-party lands and houses, leading to land conflicts. These returnees often coexist with the arrivals of newly displaced people, particularly following attacks in the districts of Macomia, Ancuabe, Meluco, and Muidumbe.
Conditions in Resettlement Centers
In May 2022, more than three-quarters of people in IDP centers in Montepuez and Metuge said they intended to return to northeast Cabo Delgado by the end of the year. The reasons given related to the inconsistency of food aid distribution and warnings of a decrease in rations, and lack of access to farmland. In addition, people spoke of the increased pressure on water, health, and education services. Around 90% of respondents claimed they cultivate in agricultural areas of less than half a hectare or have no access at all to land, making them heavily dependent on external aid.
In addition to these repulsive conditions in IDP centers, there were other factors that attracted them to their areas of origin. Their return was encouraged by the circulation of information suggesting better security around Palma and Mocímboa da Praia, by the desire to recover their properties, access to natural resources, or even by the provision of support in transport and agricultural inputs. Often, the return took place in stages, to areas closer to their places of origin, implying the split of family members, with some remaining in IDP centers, as a strategy of multiplying assistance.
Socio-Economic Conditions in the Northeast of the Province
Populations are returning to places lacking basic infrastructure and public services. Schools were heavily affected by the conflict. Our field research shows that primary education has either not reopened yet as in Mocímboa da Praia, or is concentrated in the district headquarters such as in Nangade and Macomia districts, or in some villages in the districts of Palma, Quissanga, and on the Muidumbe plateau. Secondary schools are concentrated in the district headquarters, with high pupil-teacher ratios. Closed schools now serve as temporary shelters for IDPs or barracks for military personnel.
Access to health services is concentrated in district headquarters, with an ambulatory service for outlying areas, when security conditions allow. Non-governmental organizations complement or replace the state, and there is a generalized lack of medicines. In Mocímboa da Praia, rehabilitation work has started on water supply systems.
In Macomia and Nangade, local populations cultivate in small farms around district headquarters, avoiding moving long distances. The lowlands of Muidumbe remain unsafe and unproductive. In the administrative post of Diaca in the west of Mocímboa da Praia district, and Olumbe and Quionga in Palma district, thousands of peasants have returned. The World Food Programme and the government-led Program to Promote Integrated Sustainable Rural Development (SUSTENTA) distributed inputs to peasants and, symbolically, the government launched the agricultural campaign, a national initiative, in Diaca. Nevertheless, Mocímboa da Praia residents continue to avoid walking long kilometers away from the main town. The lifting of restrictions on fishing in the districts of Palma, Mocímboa da Praia, and Quissanga encouraged the resumption of this activity, but not on the Macomia coast, or on Lake Nguri in Muidumbe where fishing continues to be heavily restricted.
In the district headquarters, trade is gradually reopening. Since April 2021, the suspension of activities and withdrawal of workers have opened up opportunities for looting by the military, a phenomenon sometimes denounced by the affected economic operators. According to reports, some of these goods were later resold in local markets, in Mueda or near the Rovuma river. More recently, TotalEnergies gave a major boost to merchants in Palma district headquarters, offering support for the return of their businesses, and breaking with alleged military monopolies. TotalEnergies has also made an effort to promote and purchase local produce, such as vegetables, fish, chicken, and bread, thereby boosting local value chains. There is also an increase in products from Tanzania. reflecting improved cross-border relations. Prices remain inflated, but are likely to decrease, due to the reopening of Mocímboa da Praia port.
Similar to the situation in IDP centers, in the northeast of the province a large part of the population live by their own efforts. Our teams are aware of gleaning in mills and agricultural fields, theft of what they find, including in old insurgent bases, where some risk collecting motorbikes, mattresses, and other goods, and hunting of small animals. There are also reports of early marriages, and increased promiscuity of young girls due to vulnerability. The absence of traditional authorities makes it difficult to resolve these issues.
Will TotalEnergies Return?
With TotalEnergies having imposed the restoration of security and the return of populations as a precondition to reverse the force majeure decision, the apparent return to normality has been highlighted by the government. TotalEnergies remains reticent and laconic. The lack of public information raises questions about the indicators to be used in assessing the level of security in the region and the return of populations.
In terms of security, it is important to assess whether it refers to the site of the LNG plant or whether it includes neighboring districts. There are particular questions about security in Mbau in southeast Mocímboa da Praia and Pundanhar in western Palma, as well as on the N380 road in northern Macomia.
It should be clear whether security is also related to the process of community reconciliation, the involvement of civil society organizations in this process, and the re-establishment of the rule of law and mechanisms of access to justice. The latter is a fundamental condition for civilians to enjoy a sense of security.
Free access for journalists and humanitarian organizations without restrictions and the possibility of documenting the return of populations can also be seen as a security indicator. Humanitarian organizations complain of the absence of regular and informative briefings by the government with updates on the security situation in the province.
It is important to reflect on whether the idea of security involves the search for political channels for conflict resolution, or the persistence of the military option, reproducing a cycle of violence, which could spread to other territories. The former would require decentralization, non-partisanship, strengthening the role of local leaders and associations, expanding channels of participation, and greater redistribution of power resources.
Regarding return, it is important to assess whether it is a return to areas of residence or to possible locations closer to the returnees' homes, and whether it is a total or partial return of families. It is also important to consider if it includes the return of civil servants and resumption of state services, as well as the quality of these services. It is important to assess whether it also includes the return of important economic services, such as financial services, warehouses, and transporters, among other activities essential for the implementation of a multi-million dollar project. It should be noted that the return of economic projects and the arrival of large numbers of workers from outside the region will increase competition and the feeling of threat among locals, reigniting local tensions.
The presence or absence of these indicators will help to understand the future of the LNG project at Afungi. Whether it will assert itself as an economic center integrated with the local economy, or whether it will become closer to a green zone with restricted access, consolidating itself as an enclave economy, of an extractive and outward-looking nature, remains to be seen.
Labor and Natural Resources Conflicts in Southern Cabo Delgado
By Tomás Queface, Cabo Ligado
Five years since the conflict in Cabo Delgado broke out, the Mozambican government has remained consistent in the way it manages the different crises and conflicts in Cabo Delgado. These do not only concern the armed insurgency that has engulfed the north of the country, but also issues related to labor conflicts and natural resources disputes. This fundamentally authoritarian approach relies on the limitation of fundamental freedoms of the working classes and citizens, and an obsession with a military solution that gives secondary importance to the integrity and protection of the communities in Cabo Delgado. This problematic approach becomes more and more evident in the south of Cabo Delgado.
The north and south of Cabo Delgado, from the start of the conflict until mid-2022, have been marked by great contrasts. The northern districts of Nangade, Muidumbe, Palma, Mocímboa da Praia, and Macomia and Meluco districts in the center, saw most of the armed violence, resulting in the flight of the population to the south of the province. This led to the concentration of large numbers of troops from the Mozambican Defense and Security Forces (FDS) and international forces from SAMIM and Rwanda in those districts. The south of Cabo Delgado, as well as Nampula provided sanctuary for thousands of IDPs fleeing the conflict in the north. Additionally, in the south, access to the displaced people was relatively easy for humanitarian organizations.
Another significant difference between the north and the south is the concentration of economic enterprise. While Cabo Delgado is known for the LNG project in Palma, it is actually in the south where most of extractive industry projects are concentrated. According to a report from the Center for Public Integrity (CIP), by February 2020 about 80% of mining concessions in Cabo Delgado province were located in the southern districts, with Montepuez and Ancuabe leading the way with 33% and 15% respectively. The northern districts of Palma, Muidumbe, and Macomia had less than 3% while the districts of Mocímboa da Praia, Nangade, and Quissanga had no mining concessions.
The expansion of attacks to the south of the province in early June this year raised alarm bells for these economic ventures. It was not long before a number of mining companies were targeted by insurgents. On 8 June, insurgents targeted the graphite mining mine, Grafex, reportedly killing three people. Several mining companies suspended their mining operations following this attack. The insurgents' incursions on the road from Pemba to Montepuez during the second wave of attacks from the south in October, led them to attack another mining company, Gemrock, which operates a ruby mining operation in the Montepuez district. Given its proximity to the attack site, Montepuez Ruby Mining (MRM) evacuated its staff. In November, Syrah Resources Limited which owns a graphite mine in the Balama district also evacuated its workforce when insurgents stormed villages on the border with the neighboring Namuno district. The government responded to the insurgent threats against the economic projects by sending a military contingent to provide security for the companies, leaving the protection of villages and towns in the hands of local militias, such as the Naparama militia in Namuno and Montepuez.
From Restricting Workers' Freedoms to Natural Resources Conflicts
In Cabo Delgado, the government is seeking at all costs to ensure the protection of the mining companies from both the insurgent threat, and their workers. This was evident in recent protests by local workers of the graphite mining company Syrah Resources in Balama district. On 7 September, local workers held a demonstration against alleged wage injustices, nepotism, and corruption. Several rounds of negotiations have taken place, however, without achieving tangible results.
According to local sources, government authorities then decided to resort to force, sending police and military contingents in order to resume operations at the mine. Some 14 strike leaders received expulsion notices and were under investigation by the Criminal Investigation Police for their participation in the strike. Some of those who were part of the demonstrations had their salaries cut. These developments frustrated not only the local workers but also damaged the relationship between the communities and the government. Locally, strikers have accused the employers of colluding with government officials.
According to the CIP, several mining concessions in the south of Cabo Delgado belong to or have as ultimate beneficiaries individuals linked to the ruling party, or with strong influential positions in the government. This is the case of General Raimundo Pachinuapa, who until September this year was a member of Frelimo’s Political Commission, the party’s highest decision-making body. Pachinuapa is also a shareholder of Mwiriti Mining, Limitada, which owns 25% of MRM. MRM has been investing heavily in its security apparatus in order to prevent illegal miners from invading the areas under concession for ruby mining. The police authorities have imposed the use of force to prevent artisanal miners from operating in those areas. However, the Center for Democracy and Development has appealed for open and honest dialogue involving MRM, local authorities, and communities living in the vicinity of the mining concession in order to put an end to these disputes.
While local youth in Cabo Delgado are marginalized and excluded from employment opportunities, access to land for artisanal mining, or even agriculture, their precarity in the workplace can leave them more vulnerable to radicalization. This authoritarianism of the state and its pervasive lack of dialogue goes against the principles of the government-led Programme for Resilience and Integrated Development in Northern Mozambique (PREDIN). PREDIN advocates the need to strengthen the capacity for dialogue between the state and citizens, as well as broaden the space for peaceful protest, as alternative platforms for expressing grievances and opinions. These mechanisms are part of the strategy to prevent radicalization and extreme violence. But these platforms for expressing opinions are increasingly being repressed, which can undermine the social contract between the state and communities that PREDIN seeks to promote. On the other hand, as long as companies do not fully comply with their obligations and are tied to the interests of influential people in the government and the party in power, the possibilities for dialogue and conflict resolution will be reduced.
Mocímboa da Praia Focus
By Peter Bofin, Cabo Ligado
November was another busy month for Mocímboa da Praia town. The port became operational for the first time since August 2020, while displaced people continued to return. The recommencement of port operations is welcome news for the local economy, particularly for the LNG project, known as Mozambique LNG and led by TotalEnergies, 60 km up the coast at Palma. Yet some security concerns remain in the wider district, and indicate the continuing threat to people living in the district. There are also concerns about the district’s preparedness to receive those returning.
Governor of Cabo Delgado province Valige Tauabo cut the ribbon on the port facility at a simple ceremony on 29 November. The port is a simple one, with two jetties, one of which can receive roll-on roll-off open deck freighters that work the coast. It was such a vessel that arrived at the end of the month carrying a cargo of vehicles that will work on road repair in the province. It also brought a tanker of petroleum, for the first petrol station in the town to resume operations. The vessel had come from Pemba, 180 km to the south. Present at the ceremony were Maxime Rabilloud, Country Chair of TotalEnergies Mozambique, as well as representatives of the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF).
Rabilloud’s presence indicates the importance of the port to Mozambique LNG. The project’s willingness to cover the freight costs of those using the service underlines this. The presence of the RDF at the ceremony, alongside the FADM stressed their continuing role in securing the province, and allowing progress on the LNG project.
Speaking at the ceremony, Governor Tauabo was realistic about the continuing security threat. He stressed the role of both SAMIM and Rwandan forces in maintaining security in the province, but urged people to be “vigilant” in case of the possible infiltration of “terrorists.”
His concerns are not misplaced. During November, insurgents killed eight civilians in the course of four incidents in the south of the district. In one attack on 24 November, a vehicle was surrounded by a large group of armed men near the village of Calugo, close to the coast in Mbau administrative post. Speaking Kimwani language, according to a source, they rhetorically asked the cars’ occupants, “who said that we abandoned Mocímboa da Praia?” Though few, these confirmed incidents justify Governor Tauabo’s call for vigilance.
There are also unconfirmed reports in circulation of insurgents moving through the district as far north as Mitope, as well as Mbau in the south. Attacks in the south are worrying, particularly as they come in the wake of the discovery of arms caches in joint FADM and Rwandan operations as recently as October. Clearing bases in the south of Mocímboa da Praia in August 2021 was one of the most significant successes of the Rwandan intervention. The fear and uncertainty that this creates affect the return process directly. In one unconfirmed account that is in circulation, insurgents asked villagers who had ordered their return, and warned them to leave.
According to the district administration, return has been strong. They told a recent humanitarian assessment team that since the beginning of August 2022 and by the time the assessment was undertaken in October, they had registered 72,594 returnees. Of those returnees, over 12,000 are residing in Mocímboa da Praia town. However, such exact figures belie what is a complex and fluid situation. Thousands can arrive weekly, according to some sources. Keeping track of them is a huge administrative challenge for an administration that is under strain.
Upon arrival, returnees must undergo a screening process by police to identify insurgents. Once through that, they must register with the local authorities who issue them with a document called a registró. This must be shown to their local leader when they want to repossess their property. In effect, not all returnees are registered. According to a source, locals estimate that up to 30% of people have no official paperwork. This creates difficulties for those people, who cannot get permission to travel without being registered. It also illustrates the risk of infiltration which Governor Tauabo warned about at the port ceremony.
Before moving on to their areas of origin, some need to stay in transit centers awaiting transport and an all-clear that their areas of origin are safe. Some areas remain to be cleared of booby traps and mines left by the insurgents. By October, over 1,700 people were living in two schools that have been repurposed as transit centers. Conditions are harsh for most of those living in makeshift shelters around the schools. For those returning to the town itself life also remains harsh. The transit centers are in schools as schools are not operational, illustrating the collapse in basic services.
Some support is reaching the town. Support to local businesses provided by Fundação Masc will be crucial to rebuilding the economy, and supporting a business class that can work with local government. Support from TotalEnergies to shipping will similarly support the business sector. Yet much remains to be done before the town becomes the small but bustling Indian Ocean port it once was.