Cabo Ligado Monthly: December 2021
December At A Glance
Vital Stats
ACLED recorded 25 organized political violence events in Cabo Delgado and Niassa provinces in December, resulting in 61 reported fatalities
Reported fatalities were highest in Macomia district, where insurgents repeatedly carried out attacks on civilians and clashed with Mozambican state forces, local militias, and troops from the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Standby Force Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM)
Other events took place in Mocimboa da Praia and Nangade districts in Cabo Delgado, as well as Lago, Lichinga, Mecula, and Muembe districts in Niassa province
Vital Trends
Fighting continued in Niassa province, suggesting that it will become a full-fledged new front in the conflict
The insurgency also intensified its effort to contest control of Macomia district, including inflicting the first combat casualties suffered by SAMIM
Planning for civilians to return to Mocimboa da Praia district continued, although returns had not commenced by the end of the month
In This Report
Analysis of the competition for recruits and support in East Africa between Somali Al Shabaab and the Islamic State (IS)
Discussion of the role religious organizations play in pursuing peace in civil conflict in Mozambique, and the potential for them to do so in Cabo Delgado
Examination of recently released government statistics about the conflict and the challenges of statistical analysis of the conflict
Details from an internal SAMIM assessment about the state of the conflict in northern Mozambique
December Situation Summary
Niassa province remained central to the narrative of the conflict in northern Mozambique in December. The Mozambican government was slow to acknowledge that the conflict had shifted west, but eventually it began to organize both a security response and a humanitarian program for people displaced from Mecula district by insurgent attacks. Neither has met with great success, however. Attacks in Niassa continued throughout December (and indeed into January), while displaced people staying at a school in Mecula town are reportedly returning home rather than await promised government assistance.
The ongoing conflict in Niassa directly threatens the safety of civilians there, and it also threatens the economic and ecological balance that communities there have worked so hard to build. Insurgent attacks have largely taken place within the bounds of the Niassa Special Reserve, a massive national conservation area that contains both an important elephant population and a crucial economic base for Niassa residents. With insurgents appearing to target Reserve personnel and equipment in their attacks, and combined with the broader displacement and violence brought by the conflict, the conservation work of the Reserve could suffer badly if the conflict remains in Niassa for a long period.
In Macomia district of Cabo Delgado province, the conflict heated up as the SADC decision about whether to extend the SAMIM mandate neared. The district – the most hotly contested of those in the SAMIM area of responsibility – was the site of the majority of the fatalities ACLED recorded in December. SADC did eventually decide to extend the SAMIM mandate in early January, but not before insurgents in Macomia inflicted the mission’s first combat death, killing a South African soldier in an ambush near Chai. With Rwandan cooperation with Mozambique deepening, it makes strategic sense for the insurgency to target SAMIM troops at moments of political decision. Of the members of the pro-government coalition, SAMIM appears to have the shakiest commitment to the cause, and, if the cost of deployment was driven high enough, might be pushed out of Cabo Delgado altogether.
The humanitarian situation remains difficult in northern Mozambique as the country enters the height of the rainy season. The government has not yet allowed civilians to return to their homes in Mocimboa da Praia district, but dissatisfaction among displaced people is growing. Some people who had been displaced from Quissanga district to Metuge district decided to return home in December, rather than remain in relocation sites where food aid and other crucial support is not reaching them frequently enough. Despite government attempts to supply displaced people with agricultural inputs to allow them to grow their own food outside the conflict zone, the pressures of widespread hunger and an impending lean season have pushed people back to areas where they risk being coerced by insurgents.
Competition Among East African Non-State Armed Groups
Somalia’s Al Shabaab released eight Swahili language recruitment videos between mid-December 2021 and mid-January 2022. When viewed in comparison with official and unofficial Islamic State (IS) online propaganda, they indicate competition for recruits between Somali Al Shabaab and IS across east and central Africa. They also display the continuing struggle between the two groups to be the true inheritors of the late Sheik Aboud Rogo, East Africa’s only significant jihadist figurehead cited by groups across the region, including in Cabo Delgado. This heightened focus on the region by both groups will shape the security challenge faced by regional governments.
The videos are the latest in the series Wahimize Waumini/Inspire the Believers, but come after a hiatus in the series of over four years. Each video is a call to hijra, meaning to leave home and defend Islam, and follows a strict format. A speaker gives either personal testimony or scriptural justification for violent jihad, followed by footage of fighters singing a jihadist anthem. Seven of the eight videos close with recordings of Rogo, long associated with Somali Al Shabaab, to underline the message of each speaker. The remaining video closes with a recording of an Al Qaeda figure, Sheikh Anwar Al Awlaki, an American cleric assassinated in Yemen in 2011. Of the seven speakers featured, two are identified as being Tanzanian, while another two speak fluent coastal Swahili.
The first six videos in the series released in July and August 2017, were also calls to hijra for foreign fighters. Only one of the six videos featured a Kenyan recruit. At the time of their release, violent jihadist groups in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Tanzania, and Mozambique were becoming increasingly networked with each other. Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) in DRC are thought to have reached out to IS at that time, the active insurgency in Cabo Delgado was just two months away, and Tanzania was rooting out a nascent insurgency in Pwani Region that was linked to both DRC and Cabo Delgado.
The latest set of videos also come at a time of heightened IS interest in Africa generally, and East Africa in particular. At ground level, IS-affiliated insurgents in northern Mozambique are proving resilient in fighting against pro-government forces. Meanwhile, in DRC, a Ugandan intervention, launched following IS attacks in Kampala, has not led to a noticeable decline in attacks in North Kivu province.
This is reflected in IS’s formal and informal communications. There has been a sustained increase in Arabic-language IS Central Media Bureau incident reporting for northern Mozambique since November 2021, through daily reports and high profile coverage in the weekly Al Naba publication. More broadly, in issue 320 of Al Naba, IS threatened to expand into new territory in Africa. They have likewise consistently disseminated visual propaganda for IS West Africa Province (ISWAP) with high production values. Such propaganda resonates across the continent. ISWAP’s latest video – released mid-January and featuring training of child soldiers – has already been edited for an East African audience, with a new Swahili and Arabic soundtrack. It has been distributed through an IS supporting Facebook account. The accompanying post notes that the towns of Zanzibar, Kigoma Ujiij, Lamu, Mombasa, and the coast from Somalia to Mozambique will be saved by jihad.
IS Swahili language communications are less consistent. While daily incident reports have not been issued in Swahili since 8 December, a round up of Al Naba reports and features has been put out in podcast form on a weekly basis since May 2021. It is distributed through postings in popular, mainstream Muslim interest Facebook groups that reach hundreds of thousands of Swahili speakers. A second weekly Al Hijrateyn podcast distributed in the same way focuses on solutions to moral dilemmas, and has been running since October 2021.
More dynamic is the informal Swahili language material produced and distributed by supporters that directly targets East Africa. The most important site for this is Facebook, with dozens of IS-supporting accounts recycling mainstream media reports of incidents, denunciations of secular government, and calls to jihad. Woven into this are clips of the aforementioned Rogo which are used to support the cause. These sit alongside sustained diatribes against Al Shabaab.
Rogo, based in Mombasa, was assassinated in August 2012, less than a month after being placed on a United Nations sanctions list for involvement in terrorism. He was believed to be a recruiter and financier for both Al Shabaab and its Kenya affiliate Al Hijra. A charismatic speaker, clips of his talks where he openly advocates terrorism, at times urges hijra to Somalia, and condemns secular, non-Islamic authority remain popular online. Though quite successfully scrubbed from YouTube, clips of his talks circulate freely on Facebook and TikTok. His denunciations of secular authority and of hypocritical clerics are easily transposed into an IS ideological context.
The propaganda from both Al Shabaab and IS has a purpose. On the ground in East and Central Africa, there is evidence of increased competition for new recruits between the two organizations. Somali Al Shabaab dominated recruitment in East Africa prior to the arrival of Islamic State. Their recruitment networks were well established in Tanga region and Zanzibar in Tanzania, while operations could be launched as far as Uganda. Al Shabaab still recruits across the region – in 2018, three Zanzibaris were arrested in Kenya trying to cross to Somalia, almost certainly to join Al Shabaab. However, Al Shabaab now faces competition from IS in key sites such as coastal areas of Tanzania, Zanzibar, and Kenya, and is now active in recruitment as well as actions in Uganda.
This situation complicates matters for governments in the region in three ways. Firstly, recruitment competition drives spending among non-state armed groups. IS’s current strategic focus on Africa is likely not just reflected in its media spending, but in actual support to affiliates. Somali Al Shabaab, though primarily focused on Somali issues, is cash rich, and so has the finances to leverage its existing networks in recruitment. This all means more support is likely to flow to pro-IS and pro-Al Shabaab groups in the near future. Secondly, easily accessible propaganda based on themes resonant within the region, and voiced by a famous figure in the region, may have unpredictable consequences outside usual conflict sites. Hamza Mohammed, perpetrator of an August shooting in Dar es Salaam, operated alone but was exposed to online material from both Somali Al Shabaab and IS. Finally, for Cabo Delgado, strengthened online networks for both Al Shabaab and IS in the region will serve to nourish the real world networks that bring fighters to the province from across the region.
Religious Organizations' Approach to the Conflict
The history of the military conflicts in post-independence Mozambique cannot be described without looking at the role and impact of religious organizations in the search for national reconciliation and peace building. Churches in particular have played a prominent role not only in humanitarian assistance, but also in leading the processes of conflict resolution in Mozambique. The ongoing armed conflict in northern Mozambique is no exception.
After becoming independent from Portugal in 1975, two years later, Mozambique witnessed a civil war between government forces and the Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO) that ravaged the country for 16 years. Political causes are said to be at the root of the civil war, but these were exacerbated by deep social and ethnic divisions, poverty, and social inequality. Under the leadership of the Christian Council of Mozambique (CCM), Mozambican churches became directly involved in the search for a solution to the war in 1984 through the creation of the Commission for Peace and National Reconciliation. Based on the conviction that peace would only come from dialogue and the unity of Mozambicans, the Commission had enormous influence in persuading the leadership of the government and RENAMO to engage in dialogue. In 1987, after a decade of fighting, and in light of the reality that the war was far from ending, the then-president of Mozambique, Joaquim Chissano, accepted a proposal for dialogue put forward by CCM, and showed an openness to dialogue with RENAMO. Likewise, several clerics met with RENAMO leader Afonso Dhlakama, who also showed interest in dialogue. As a result, the parties reached a cessation of hostilities agreement in 1992 in Rome.
The negotiations that culminated in the signing of the Rome Agreement were also in part the result of work done by a lay Catholic organization, the Community of Sant'Egidio. The dialogue sessions took place for a year at the headquarters of the Sant'Egidio Community and were mediated by the Mozambican bishop Jaime Gonçalves, two representatives of the Sant'Egidio Community, and a representative of the government of Italy. In the post-conflict period, religious institutions were fundamental in the process of national reconciliation, in the return of displaced persons to their areas of origin, in the implementation of the disarmament and reintegration program, as well as in the creation of an electoral observatory that aimed to ensure integrity and transparency in electoral processes. Included in the electoral observatory were CCM, the Islamic Council of Mozambique (CISLAMO), and the Catholic Church's Episcopal Conference of Mozambique (CEM), among others.
However, in 2012, hostilities between the government led by Frelimo and the largest opposition party Renamo resumed, reviving the traumas of the civil war. As a means of exerting greater pressure on the government regarding a number of political demands, Dhlakama returned to his military base in the central province of Sofala, and began training veterans. In 2013, an attack on a police station in Maringue, Sofala province represented the beginning of military hostilities. RENAMO boycotted the 2013 elections, plunging the country into uncertainty. Once again the churches called for the preservation of the 1992 peace agreement, unity, and reconciliation among Mozambicans. After several rounds of dialogue between the government and Renamo, the two parties reached a new peace agreement that temporarily ended military hostilities and made room for the 2014 general elections, this time with the participation of Renamo.
The political crisis in Mozambique ignited again after the 2014 general elections were held. Frelimo won the elections which were strongly contested by Renamo. Armed violence followed and once again forced the government and Renamo to the negotiating table. The dialogue was mediated by Mozambican religious figures Dom Dinis Sengulane, Bishop Emeritus of the Anglican Church of Mozambique, and Father Filipe Couto. Later, the dialogue adopted international mediation, with Mario Raffaelli and Angelo Romano of the Community of Sant'Egidio as mediators representing the European Union. Dhalkama passed away in 2018 following an illness, and his replacement, Ossufo Momade, signed the third peace agreement with the Mozambican government in August 2019, marking the end of hostilities with the government. Once again, religious organizations were crucial to the achievement of peace and the end of military hostilities.
Mozambique is once again embroiled in a military conflict, this time in the northern provinces of Cabo Delgado and Niassa. Religious organizations have become involved in providing humanitarian assistance and speaking out for the victims of the conflict. Caritas, a humanitarian organization of the Catholic Church, has sent food and clothing to those displaced by the conflict, and along with CCM, has provided psychosocial support to those displaced. Religious organizations have also denounced the numerous human rights violations throughout the conflict. In his time as Bishop of Pemba, Dom Luiz Fernando Lisboa was very critical of the government's approach to the conflict, accusing the armed forces of abusing civilians. He likewise called for greater international intervention in the humanitarian crisis in Cabo Delgado province. As well, Dinis Matsolo, bishop of the Methodist Church in Mozambique, has asserted that a military solution is not enough to end the crisis, drawing attention to the need to look at issues of socio-economic development and promotion of social harmony.
Inter-religious dialogue events have been a platform used by different religious organizations to propose solutions to the conflict. A recent interfaith meeting of religious leaders took place on 3 January 2022 in Pemba. In the final declaration, the leaders rejected any association between violence and religion. They emphasized that the conflict is exacerbated by social, economic, and ethnic factors, and that religion should be part of the solution. Religious leaders in Mozambique say they are encouraging the government to engage in dialogue with insurgents as a way to end the violence.
Religious organizations have a strong legacy of promoting peace and reconciliation during civil conflicts in Mozambique. Religious organizations operate at the local level, and often use their local knowledge to draw attention to the social, economic, and ethnic inequalities that drive conflict. Peace initiatives conducted by religious organizations have proven throughout the history of independent Mozambique to be a workable and effective solution to armed conflicts. It is likely that the path to ending the conflict in northern Mozambique will also involve the participation of religious organizations, so long as the government is willing to accept their assistance.
Measuring the Conflict in 2021
In a speech to parliament on 16 December, Mozambican President Filipe Nyusi argued that 2021 had been a year of substantial progress in improving security in northern Mozambique. To support his claim, he pointed to statistics kept by his government measuring the number of insurgent attacks suffered by Mozambican civilians over the course of the year. In 2021, he claimed, insurgents launched 52 attacks against civilians in northern Mozambique. That number, he said, was down from 2020, when there were just over 160 attacks.
Nyusi’s appeal to statistics is important for two reasons. The first is that it helps us understand the way the government is tracking success in the conflict. Though there has been no release of the data underlying Nyusi’s numbers, nor any explanation of how they were arrived at, his divulging of government data gives us a sense of the government’s priorities and a way to evaluate Nyusi’s argument with public data. When measured with ACLED data, Nyusi’s overall claim that insurgents attacks on civilians fell year on year in 2021 holds up fairly well. ACLED records 297 incidents of violence against civilians involving insurgents in Cabo Delgado in 2020. In 2021, ACLED records 121 incidents of violence against civilians involving insurgents across both Cabo Delgado and Niassa provinces, taking into account the conflict’s geographic expansion. Though the numbers of incidents do not match up to Nyusi’s count, the proportions are similar. Nyusi claimed a roughly 68% reduction in attacks, while ACLED data show a roughly 59% reduction.* Though the conflict appears far from over, these reductions are believable, since the insurgency spent more time on the offensive in 2020 than it did in 2021.
Yet, conversely, the second reason these statistics are important is that they underline how little clarity there is from the Mozambican government about how it views the state of the conflict. Because the government has not divulged any of the methodology or underlying data behind the statistics, it is impossible to tell what the government counts as an attack or to verify whether the claimed attacks took place. Definitions matter in this context. For example, in ACLED data, insurgent action that results only in the destruction of property – such as the burning of houses – does not count as an incident of violence against civilians unless civilians are directly assaulted. That is, the 121 incidents ACLED records of violence against civilians involving insurgents in 2021 does not include a substantial number of incidents in which insurgents executed their most common modus operandi: burning homes. Without an understanding of the government’s definition of an “attack,” it is hard to know how accurate Nyusi’s data are.
Indeed, some internal government statistics call Nyusi’s claims into question. A leaked presentation put together by the Nangade district government tallies the “damage caused by terrorism to public and state infrastructure” in the district between January and August 2021. The survey covers 22 villages, detailing deaths, homes and offices burned, and vehicles and machinery destroyed by insurgent attacks. The data are organized by village, rather than by attack, but even if we assume that each village was only attacked once in that time period, it still suggests that 42% of the 52 attacks Nyusi referred to took place in Nangade district between January and August. Given the large number of insurgent attacks on civilians that took place in Macomia and Palma districts in 2021, either that proportion is wrong, the president and the district government are using different methodology to measure attacks, or there were more attacks than Nyusi claimed. In ACLED’s data, incidents in Nangade district account for about 26% of incidents of violence against civilians involving insurgents in Cabo Delgado and Niassa provinces in 2021, just less than Macomia district and slightly more than Palma district.
In fact, comparing the Nangade government data to the ACLED data reveals the challenges of tracking the conflict. The district government records 99 fatalities, 121 motor vehicles destroyed, and an astonishing 5,263 homes burned across the 22 villages between January and August of 2021. ACLED data for the same period show just 21 fatalities in acts of violence against civilians involving insurgents in Nangade district overall. Only 15 of those deaths took place in villages mentioned in the Nangade government data – the others happened in attacks on places like Luneke and Namiune, which were not included in the district government survey. There is no reason to believe that the district government data are fundamentally flawed (although, again, it would be useful to have a public accounting of what the district counted as “damage caused by terrorism”). Instead, the disparity between the government data and ACLED data – which rely on both public sources and original reporting – highlights the difficulty of gathering information about the conflict in an environment where the government prevents journalists from reporting from the front lines.
Latest SAMIM Assessment
As set out in Cabo Ligado’s December weekly reporting, SADC forces continued to battle insurgents, mainly in Macomia and Nangade districts throughout the month, killing a number of insurgents, but also taking several casualties themselves.
Cabo Ligado has secured insight into SAMIM’s own internal assessments of progress and challenges in Cabo Delgado. The assessments were made ahead of SADC’s January 2022 Summit that extended SAMIM operations for an expected six months. The assessment is a sobering reflection of an array of operational and logistical issues in play, setting a scene for strengthening counterinsurgency operations and strategic planning in the months ahead.
Following the October 2021 Organ Troika meeting that authorized the extension of the SAMIM mission to mid-January 2021, an assessment was conducted that led to the presentation of a progress report to SADC’s Inter State Defence and Security Committee in early November.
The assessment charts operational progress between August and October 2021, and reflects on various developments from changing insurgent tactics (i.e. the use of IEDs and the challenge of tackling smaller disparate insurgent groups) to the limitations of information and intelligence sharing, which has become even more challenging in a complex and fluid security situation.
The decision to establish a Joint Operation Committee (JOC) with representatives from the Mozambican military, the Rwanda Defence Force, and SAMIM following the joint forces commanders meeting at Mocimboa da Praia on 13 October opened the door to more effective counterinsurgency options. It is unclear, however, how effective the JOC has been. SAMIM remains unclear about the number of insurgents killed, and the whereabouts of insurgent forces that had been estimated by Mozambique at 2,500 – 3,000 strong. SAMIM’s report suggests only a few hundred are still active in the field, and that an unknown number may have moved into other areas of Cabo Delgado, including infiltration back into civilian populations, as well as north of the Ruvuma river, into Tanzania.
After the capture of material from insurgent bases in September, SAMIM established a Joint Intelligence Task Team, comprising some member state representatives, who together reviewed captured insurgent materials, which has enabled SAMIM to gain further insight into the leadership, member origins, and organizational structure of the insurgency. This information clearly informed subsequent SAMIM operations that focused on disabling remaining bases in the Macomia area in late November and December. Materials captured during earlier operations confirm that operational leadership in the insurgency is in the hands of Mozambicans and that there are some foreign elements that guide overall strategic leadership. The report, however, confirms speculation that Mozambique has not been sharing intelligence on these issues with SAMIM.
The recovery of hundreds of Qurans and other texts of religious instruction confirmed that insurgents have what the assessment calls “a well-organised extremist Islamic indoctrination program.” It is also clear that they had plans to extend operations into neighboring provinces (i.e. Niassa, Zambezia, and Nampula).
The assessment points to some positive security developments, namely that police stations in some affected villages are again operational and that community policing structures in affected areas are functional. What this means in practice though is unclear. Building relations between SAMIM forces and local communities will be an essential longer-term goal. The SAMIM report points to opportunities for the security forces to build a winning hearts and minds strategy, as the population provides ‘support’ for insurgents largely out of fear of insurgent coercion.
The assessment also reflects on the important role joint forces are playing with respect to the humanitarian situation, supporting displaced people returning to their communities in some areas and assisting with the provision of support to them from a raft of NGOs and humanitarian agencies. Expediting returns of displaced people, however, is complicated by a clear need to ensure improved intelligence and liaison capacity within these communities, which is critical for tackling the insurgent infiltration challenge.
The assessment looks at SAMIM’s current military capabilities versus required capabilities, concluding that logistics support is inadequate, and highlighting the need for beefing up aircraft logistical support, maritime patrol aircraft, and improved communications between marine and ground forces. SAMIM’s leadership has called on its member states to urgently provide resources to cover the air, ground, and maritime capability gaps, including a dedicated air medical evacuation team. Interestingly, the report calls on Mozambique to provide detail of its “training requirements,” something it has evidently already provided to the EU’s Training Mission and Rwanda. This may explain why the Zimbabwe training component of the SADC intervention remains on ice.
*Ironically, Nyusi’s raw numbers match up more closely with those from the Islamic State (IS). In an end-of-year roundup, the group claimed 68 attacks in Mozambique in 2021.